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Arbitration is a well-established method of dispute resolution in Malaysia. It is set to grow in popularity with the increasing volume of cross-border trade and investment, especially with the advent of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). This is because of its many advantages, such as speed, confidentiality, the ability to provide a neutral forum to resolve disputes (especially between parties of different nationalities) as well as according parties with the autonomy to nominate arbitrators and to design the arbitration procedure. This article seeks to provide an overview of the arbitration landscape in Malaysia. The first section of this article will introduce the main aspects of arbitration, with references to some of the salient features of Malaysia’s arbitration laws as well as to the relevant case law, while the second section will introduce the developments in Malaysia’s arbitration scene in recent years, notably the growing prominence of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA).

Main aspects of arbitration and arbitration laws of Malaysia

The primary source of law in relation to both international and domestic arbitration in Malaysia is the Arbitration Act 2005 as amended by the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2011 (the Act). The Act is modelled after the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006. It also incorporates important articles from the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New York Convention), to which Malaysia is a signatory. As Malaysia is a common law jurisdiction, the Act is further supplemented by case law that interprets the provisions of the Act.

Arbitration agreement

An arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes, actual or potential, between them in respect of a defined legal relationship (eg, a contractual relationship).1 Since arbitration is consensual, the arbitration agreement is fundamental in evidencing the parties’ consent to arbitrate their disputes. An arbitration agreement may take the form of an arbitration clause contained in a contract.2 Alternatively, a reference to an arbitration clause in a separate document also constitutes an arbitration agreement, provided that the agreement is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the agreement.3

This latter provision was first interpreted by the High Court of Kota Kinabalu in CTI Group Inc v International Bulk Carrier SPA (CTI Group).4 There, the defendant sought to set aside an order for the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds that, inter alia, it did not sign the Share Transfer Agreement (STA) that contained an arbitration clause, and therefore should not be compelled to arbitrate the dispute. However, the defendant had signed a number of annexures that made clear reference to the STA. Thus, the question before the High Court was whether the arbitration clause in the STA was incorporated by reference to the annexures and should, accordingly, bind the defendant.

The High Court of Kota Kinabalu cited the Federal Court case of Ajwa for Food Industries Co (MIGOP) Egypt v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd.5 In that case, the contract referred to a standard set of terms and conditions that contained an arbitration clause. However, no specific reference was made to the arbitration clause, nor were the standard terms and conditions attached to the contract. The Federal Court held as follows:

We are of the view that the mere fact the arbitration clause is not referred to in the contract and that there is a mere reference to standard conditions which was neither accepted nor signed, is not sufficient to exclude the existence of the valid arbitration clause. There is no requirement that the arbitration agreement contained in the document must be explicitly referred to in the reference. The reference need only be to the document and no explicit reference to the arbitration clause contained therein is required.6

Adopting the Federal Court’s reasoning, the High Court of Kota Kinabalu in CTI Group held that the arbitration clause in the STA bound the defendant because it was incorporated by reference into the annexures. Further, the annexures were integral to the STA, which meant that the defendant could not have been unaware of the STA and the arbitration clause.

The matter subsequently proceeded to the Court of Appeal of Putrajaya, which allowed the appeal and set aside the registration of the arbitral award. It pointed out that the defendant was not a signatory to the agreement in any manner or had any form of nexus as provided for in sections 9(1) to (5) of the Act, and consequently the arbitration agreement could not be registered as such, pursuant to section 38 of the Act.7 It remains to be seen how this issue will be considered in subsequent decisions given that the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement does not accord with the Federal Court’s decision in Ajwa for Food Industries Co (MIGOP) Egypt v Pacific Inter-Link Sdn Bhd, which held that a mere reference to a document containing an arbitration clause was sufficient to constitute an arbitration agreement – even if the document was not signed and even if the arbitration clause was not specifically referred to.

Stay of proceedings

Where parties have agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration, the Malaysian courts generally will not, subject to certain conditions, lend aid to a party who, in breach of the arbitration agreement, commences a suit in court by hearing the suit. Rather, the courts are inclined to stay such court proceedings and direct the parties to arbitrate the dispute. This is reflected in section 10(1) of the Act, which provides as follows:

A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

The relevant legal principles in relation to section 10(1) of the Act have been helpfully laid down by the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in the case of ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd v Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd.8 These principles may be summarised as follows:

  • As the language in section 10(1) of the Act is couched in mandatory terms with the use of the word ‘shall’, the court is obliged to stay court proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration where the terms of section 10(1) of the Act are met.9
  • The only exception to the above is where the court finds the agreement to be ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’.10 These constraints must relate to the arbitration agreement itself, and not the underlying contract or subject matter.11 They may also relate to circumstances where it is legally or practically impossible to make valid references to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause.12
  • The court will only stay proceedings that are brought in respect of a matter that is the subject of an arbitration agreement.13 This is a three-step inquiry:14
  • What is the nature of the plaintiff’s claim?
  • What is the ambit of the arbitration agreement?
  • Does the plaintiff’s claim fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement?
  • Only where the plaintiff’s claim falls within the ambit of the arbitration agreement is the court then obliged to stay the court proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration.
  • For the court to order a stay, there must be a dispute to refer to arbitration.15 However, the court is not required to evaluate, let alone determine, the merits of the plaintiff’s claims or the defendant’s defences when deciding whether to grant a stay.16
  • The party seeking a stay of court proceedings must not have taken such a step in the proceedings as to disentitle it to the order of stay. A step in the proceedings is a definitive, conscious and deliberate step taken in respect of participating in the court proceedings.17
  • Arbitration agreements should be construed broadly so as to give effect to the contractual choice of the parties as opposed to defeating their agreement. Such an approach accords with the philosophy of minimal court intervention in matters that parties had agreed to submit to arbitration.18

Appointment of arbitrators

The Act gives the parties freedom to agree on a procedure for appointing arbitrators.19 In the absence of such an agreement, the Act provides for certain default procedures. Thus, if the parties fail to agree on the appointment of arbitrators, any party may apply to the Director of the KLRCA for such appointment.20 If the Director in turn fails to appoint the arbitrators, any party may then apply to the High Court to seek its assistance to do so.21 In appointing the arbitrators, the Director or the High Court shall have due regard to several factors, such as any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the parties’ agreement.22

To what extent and on what basis can a party challenge the appointment of arbitrators by the Director? This question was considered by the Court of Appeal of Malaysia at Kuching, Sarawak in the case of Sebiro Holdings Sdn Bhd v Bhag Singh.23 Before the High Court, the appellant sought but failed to terminate the appointment of the respondent as arbitrator on the grounds that he lacked geographical knowledge of Sarawak, which was the place of performance of the underlying contract. In dismissing its appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that ‘the power exercised by the Director of the KLRCA under subsections 13(4) and (5) of [the Act] is an administrative power’ and therefore ‘[his function] is not a judicial function where he has to afford the right to be heard to the parties before an arbitrator(s) is appointed’.24 Following from this, it was held that:25

the Court cannot interpose and interdict the appointment of an arbitrator whom the parties have agreed to be appointed by the named appointing authority under the terms of the Contract, except in cases where it is proved that there are circumstances which give rise to justifiable doubt as the [arbitrator’s] impartiality or independence or that the [arbitrator] did not possess the qualification agreed to by the parties.

On the facts, since there was no pre-agreement between the parties as to the arbitrator’s qualification, the arbitrator could not be disqualified on the grounds argued by the appellant.

Reference on questions of law

As mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental tenets of the modern arbitration regime is minimal curial interference. Indeed, the Act states that ‘[n]o court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except where so provided in this Act’.26 Therefore, there are limited avenues through which an arbitral award may be challenged before the courts in Malaysia. One of them is for the aggrieved party to apply to the High Court to set aside an arbitral award on certain exhaustive grounds laid down in section 37 of the Act. The other avenue is for that party to refer a question of law to the High Court in accordance with section 42 of the Act, which is the subject of consideration in Awangku Dewa Bin Pgn Momin v Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Limbang Division, decided by the Court of Appeal of Malaysia sitting at Kuching, Sarawak,27 and in Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd, decided by the Court of Appeal of Putrajaya.28

The first case concerned disputes over native customary rights over certain parcels of land located in Kuala Lawas, Sarawak. Dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s award in favour of the respondent, the appellants sought to refer eight questions of law to the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak. The High Court refused to set aside the award on the grounds that ‘[t]here was no error on the face of the award and there was no reason to intervene on the questions of law or to set aside the award’.29 The Court of Appeal agreed with the result, but disapproved of the High Court’s treatment of the proceedings ‘as if it is an ‘appeal’ against the decision of the arbitrator’.30 Citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pembinaan LCL Sdn Bhd v SK Styrofoam (M) Sdn Bhd, it cautioned that ‘the High Court in exercising its statutory jurisdiction under [the Act] does not enjoy appellate jurisdiction’.31 The Court of Appeal then proceeded to lay down the following guidance:32

A High Court in dealing with a 42 reference must summarily dismiss the application, without even attempting to answer the ‘question of law’ posed to the court, if the question is, in the first place, not properly and intelligibly framed; or where it is clear to the court that there is a disguised attempt by the applicant to appeal against the decision of the arbitral tribunal.

On the facts, the Court of Appeal concluded that ‘the eight ‘questions of law’ referred to by the High Court were not genuine questions of law, but rather an attempt to appeal against the decision of the arbitrator’33 and thus dismissed the appeal.

Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd concerned an arbitral award that contained decisions on matters that were not brought up by the parties and where the parties were not given the opportunity to address those matters. In the arbitral proceedings, even though the arbitral tribunal had found that the counterclaiming defendant had failed to adduce evidence on the quantum of loss that it had suffered, the arbitral tribunal proceeded to summarily fix an inflation rate of 20 per cent on the balance of the contract price in arriving at a ‘reasonable’ award of damages for the counterclaim.34

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought against the decision of the High Court varying the award. The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that, in depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to address the arbitral tribunal on the rate of inflation, a complaint under section 42 was made out.35 The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge that the issue referred (ie, ‘whether an Arbitral Tribunal can impose a percentage based on inflation rate to represent the cost of work done without a plea on that point and no invitation for submissions on the same being called for from parties through their counsel’) was indeed a question of law within the meaning of section 42 of the Act.36

In coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the jurisdiction under section 42 ‘is not a provision as to appeals but a reference on a question of law’, and helpfully set down the approach to be taken in considering an application under section 42:

  • The court must first ask the hypothetical question (taking the complaint of the applicant at its highest) of whether the purported question of law raised will substantially affect the rights of the parties arising out of the award. If not, the application must be dismissed in limine.37
  • The applicant must also make out a case that it has suffered ‘patent injustice’, as a threshold requirement in order for the court to consider the application on its merits.38
  • If the applicant is successful in making out a case of ‘patent injustice’, only then would the court deal with the application on the merits.
  • The Court of Appeal expressly eschewed an approach that allowed for reopening of the facts, and, while highlighting that a common sense approach ought to be taken, specifically pointed out that the question of law must arise out of the award, and that the applicant ‘must demonstrate the question of law looking at the award and not any other extraneous material’.39
  • The Court of Appeal also made clear that even if there had been an error on a question of law, the court ought first to consider whether the case was a fit and proper one for remission to the Tribunal. If it was, the case ought to be remitted; as pointed out by the Court of Appeal, ‘...[t]his is a safe guard guaranteed in section 42 itself to sustain party autonomy... where the court takes the view that the arbitrator has fallen into error and/or what often under the previous regime is referred to as a technical misconduct.’40 The Court of Appeal made clear that setting aside or varying the award would only be appropriate if the case was not a fit and proper one for remission.

Setting aside

Section 37 of the Act sets out the grounds under which the High Court may set aside an arbitral award. It states that the party making the application is to provide proof that:

  • a party to the arbitration agreement was under any incapacity;
  • the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of Malaysia;
  • he or she was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party’s case;
  • the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration;
  • the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or
  • the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Act from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Act.

It also provides that the High Court finds that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia or the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia.

Two points should be noted where setting aside of an award is concerned. First, the High Court can only intervene on matters specifically set out in section 37 of the Act.41 This is because section 8 of the Act limits the scope of intervention by the High Court to such extent as is provided in the Act. It follows that the High Court cannot invoke its inherent powers to set aside an arbitral award.42 Second, it is clear from the use of the word ‘may’ rather than the word ‘shall’ in section 37(1) of the Act that the High Court is vested with the discretion to intervene subject to any specific requirements of the Act.43 For example, the party making the application must provide proof, that is, he must prove to the court the matters complained of on a balance of probabilities.44

Three of the setting-aside grounds listed above were considered by the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in Kelana Erat Sdn Bhd v Niche Properties Sdn Bhd.45 The parties entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to undertake a mixed housing and commercial development project on a piece of land in Johor. Several disputes arose between the parties, which were resolved by arbitration in the plaintiff’s favour. The plaintiff then sought to enforce the award, while the defendant sought to set it aside.

The defendant argued that the award contained decisions on matters beyond the scope of submission to the arbitration (section 37(1)(a)(v) of the Act) and not falling within the terms of the submission to the arbitration (section 37(1)(a)(iv) of the Act). The High Court disagreed, citing the following proposition from Taman Bandar Baru Masai Sdn Bhd v Dindings Corporations Sdn Bhd:46 ‘It is trite that the arbitrator has a general jurisdiction to deal with all matters relating to the dispute and this will cover incidental matters.’47 This comports with the ‘more expansive and extensive definition of an ‘arbitration agreement’ under [the Act]’ which ‘justifies such a practical approach in promoting arbitration as a one-stop centre to resolve any and every dispute arising out of or under an agreement’.48 The High Court’s reasoning is reminiscent of the oft-cited passage in the House of Lords decision of Fiona Trust and Holding Corp v Privalov:49

[T]he construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.

The defendant also argued that the award was against the public policy of Malaysia (section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the Act) because the plaintiff’s attempt to delay or derail the housing development project would not be in the public interest. In rejecting this argument, the High Court distinguished between the adjudication by the arbitrator on the parties’ rights under the JVA, which was not contrary to public policy, and the subject matter of the arbitration, which may engage issues of public policy.50 The High Court also adopted the test of public policy laid down in the Singapore High Court decision of AJU v AJT:

Thus, in order for AJT to succeed in setting aside the award on the ground that upholding the award would be in conflict with the public policy of Singapore, it has to establish, first, that the tribunal decided erroneously on the issue of illegality of the concluding agreement. Next, it has to show that the error was of such a nature that enforcement of the award would ‘shock the conscience,’ be ‘clearly injurious to the public good’ or would contravene ‘fundamental notions and principles of justice’.51

On the facts, the High Court opined that it could not be said that arbitral proceedings, which may delay the completion of the housing development project, were contrary to public policy per se. Also, in adopting the test of public policy enunciated in AJU v AJT, the High Court seemed to be of the view that the present award was not of such a nature that would ‘shock the conscience’, be ‘clearly injurious to the public good’ or would ‘contravene fundamental notions and principles of justice’. Therefore, the defendant’s attempt to set aside the arbitral award on the grounds of public policy failed.

Developments of arbitration in Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA)

The KLRCA was set up in 1978 by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO) to provide a neutral venue in the Asia-Pacific region for the arbitration of disputes in relation to trade, commerce and investment. Today, it hosts and administers domestic and international commercial arbitrations, and offers other dispute resolution processes, such as adjudication and mediation. The KLRCA has its own institutional arbitration rules, which are modelled after the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration. In addition, it has developed new procedural rules to cater for the various needs and demands of the international business community.

For example, in 2012, the KLRCA pioneered a set of procedural rules known as the ‘i-Arbitration Rules’. These rules are shariah compliant and suitable for arbitration of disputes that arise out of an agreement premised on the principles of shariah.52 Arbitral awards decided in accordance with the i-Arbitration Rules will be enforceable in the signatory countries to the New York Convention. One of the innovative provisions of the i-Arbitration Rules is Rule 11, which provides for a procedure for reference to the Shariah Advisory Council or a shariah expert whenever the arbitral tribunal has to form an opinion on a point related to shariah principles, and decide on a dispute arising from the shariah aspect of the contract. The arbitral tribunal may refer the matter to the relevant Council or shariah expert for its ruling.

The applicable law at the place of business will determine which Shariah Advisory Council is relevant. In Malaysia, for example, Islamic banking is regulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia, whereas the Islamic capital market is regulated by the Securities Commission. Therefore, in an Islamic banking matter or capital market matter, the ‘relevant council’ means the Shariah Advisory Council under the Central Bank of Malaysia or the Securities Commission, respectively.53

Another set of procedural rules designed by the KLRCA is the ‘Fast Track Arbitration Rules’. These rules are targeted at parties that wish to obtain an award expeditiously with minimal costs. To this end, various controls are put in place. For example, the Fast Track Arbitration Rules state that the arbitral tribunal shall publish the final award no later than 90 days (documents-only arbitration)54 or 160 days (arbitration with a substantive oral hearing)55 from the commencement of the arbitration. In contrast, arbitrations proceeding under the usual KLRCA Arbitration Rules are estimated to be completed in about a year or more. As for the costs and expenses of arbitration, under the Fast Track Arbitration Rules, the maximum amount that either party shall be entitled to recover is capped at 30 per cent (documents-only arbitration) and 50 per cent (arbitration with a substantive oral hearing) of the total amount of claim and counterclaim (if any).56

The KLRCA has also been very active in promoting arbitration through tie-ups with other organisations. For example:

  • It was engaged in advanced talks with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to make the KLRCA an alternative venue for PCA cases.57
  • It signed an agreement with the International Council of Arbitration for Sports (ICAS) to be the alternative hearing centre for sports arbitration.58
  • In mid-2015, the KLRCA set up a new Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law Department that was headed by an experienced practitioner.59
  • It has entered into an agreement with the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) with a view to exploring areas of co-operation in the provision of arbitration services to international and domestic parties.60
  • It has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) to enhance the collaboration and exchange between the two organisations and to promote sporting dispute resolution.61
  • It has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Securities Industry Dispute Resolution Centre (SIDREC) to further the common aim of promoting the use of alternative dispute resolution in relation to capital market products and services disputes in Malaysia and the region.62
  • In March 2016, it organised the inaugural KLRCA International Investment Arbitration Conference (KIIAC 2016) in collaboration with the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS). In the conference, various issues concerning international investment arbitration were addressed by the speakers, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region, given the recent signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).63

It is apparent from this flurry of activities that the KLRCA is keen to establish itself as a hearing venue for the resolution of both international and domestic disputes, including international investment disputes between investors and the host government.

Other developments in Malaysia

There are three reasons why the developments in Malaysia’s arbitration landscape appear promising.

First, the KLRCA has grown from strength to strength over the years. Despite facing intense competition from regional heavyweights such as the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), the KLRCA has become more prominent and continues to attract an increased caseload year on year. This is attributable to KLRCA’s constant improving of its services to meet the demands and needs of the global business community, and active efforts in collaborating with other organisations, both within and outside of Malaysia, which helps to boost its visibility.

Second, a critical decision was made about a decade ago to repeal the outmoded Arbitration Act 1952, which was based on the English Arbitration Act 1950, and to enact the present Act. This was a significant move because it brought the arbitral regime in Malaysia in line with modern arbitral practice. After a few teething years, the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2011 was introduced to further improve the Act. This series of improvements was discussed in some detail in last year’s article. There were also improvements to other legislation, such as the amendments to the Legal Profession Act, which came into force about two years ago and liberalised the legal sector in Malaysia. Foreign law firms and foreign lawyers are now permitted to appear in arbitral proceedings in Malaysia. Furthermore, the absence of a requirement to pay withholding tax on arbitrator’s fees earned is welcome news to foreign arbitrators.

Last but not least, the Malaysian courts have been supportive of the arbitration regime in Malaysia. As Datuk Professor Sundra Rajoo, director of the KLRCA, puts it: ‘The courts have been enforcing awards and more importantly, supporting awards. They give interim measures and they also support arbitral awards and applications from arbitrations that are seated outside Malaysia.’64 This encompassing attitude of the courts in not striking down arbitral awards readily further strengthens Malaysia’s role and position in the international arbitration community.

In sum, the confluence of the three factors above – a strong arbitral institution, laws favourable to arbitration and a judiciary supportive of the arbitration regime – contribute to the success of arbitration in Malaysia today.


  1. Section 9(1) of the Act.
  2. Section 9(2) of the Act.
  3. Sections 9(2) and (5) of the Act.
  4. [2014] 11 MLJ 205.
  5. [2013] 5 MLJ 625.
  6. Ibid, at paragraph 26.
  7. [2014] 6 MLJ 851 at [7].
  8. [2014] 10 MLJ 633.
  9. Ibid, at paragraph 26.
  10. Ibid, at paragraph 26.
  11. Ibid, at paragraphs 63 and 64.
  12. Ibid, at paragraphs 64 and 65.
  13. Ibid, at paragraph 36.
  14. Ibid, at paragraphs 38 and 39.
  15. Ibid, at paragraph 81.
  16. Ibid, at paragraph 61.
  17. Ibid, at paragraph 100.
  18. Ibid, at paragraph 47.
  19. Section 13(2) of the Act.
  20. Sections 13(4), (5) and (6) of the Act.
  21. Section 13(7) of the Act.
  22. Section 13(8) of the Act.
  23. [2015] 4 CLJ 409.
  24.  Ibid, at paragraph 17.
  25. Ibid, at paragraph 21.
  26. Section 8 of the Act.
  27. [2015] 3 MLJ 161.
  28. [2016] 2 MLRA 407.
  29. Ibid, at paragraph 16.
  30. Ibid, at paragraph 17.
  31. Ibid, at paragraph 19.
  32. Ibid, at paragraph 28.
  33. Ibid, at paragraph 22.
  34. [2016] 2 MLRA 407, at paragraph 2.
  35. Ibid, at paragraph 7.
  36. Ibid, at paragraph 13.
  37. Ibid, at paragraph 40.
  38. Ibid, at paragraph 41.
  39. Ibid, at paragraphs 42 to 45.
  40. Ibid, at paragraph 46.
  41. Kelana Erat Sdn Bhd v Niche Properties Sdn Bhd [2012] 5 MLJ 809, at paragraph 16.
  42. Ibid, at paragraph 49.
  43. Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 11 MLJ 561, at paragraph 62.
  44. Ibid, at paragraph 63.
  45. [2012] 5 MLJ 809.
  46. Ibid, at paragraph 35.
  47. [2010] 5 CLJ 83 at 105.
  48. [2012] 5 MLJ 809, at paragraph 36.
  49. [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Reports 254, at paragraph 13.
  50. [2012] 5 MLJ 809, at paragraph 42.
  51. [2010] 4 SLR 649, at paragraph 15.
  52. Guide to KLRCA i-Arbitration Rules.
  53. Ibid.
  54. Article 12(4), KLRCA Fast Track Arbitration Rules.
  55. Article 12(5), KLRCA Fast Track Arbitration Rules.
  56. Article 14(3), KLRCA Fast Track Arbitration Rules.
  58. Ibid.
  59. KLRCA Newsletter (Jul-Sept 2015), page 4.
  60. KLRCA Newsletter (Jul-Sept 2015), page 6.
  61. KLRCA Newsletter (Oct-Dec 2015), page 6.
  62. Ibid, page 7.
  63. Ibid, pages 12 to 13.

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