Australia has a long-standing tradition of embracing arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. At a domestic level this is reflected by court-annexed and compulsory arbitration prescribed for certain disputes. Arbitration has become equally common in international disputes. Traditionally, arbitration in Australia was largely confined to disputes in areas such as building and construction. Strong and steady growth of the Australian economy over much of the past two decades and the opening of Asian markets have accelerated a growing trend towards the use of arbitration in other areas, particularly the energy and trade sectors.
Australia continues to develop as an attractive hub for international arbitration. The pro-arbitration approach taken by Australian courts and the dynamic nature of Australia’s arbitration legal framework, in particular the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA), have combined to put Australia at the forefront of international arbitration in the Asia-Pacific region.
Arbitration law reforms in Australia
Australia’s international arbitration framework underwent significant changes in 2010. Importantly, amendments to the IAA adopted the 2006 version of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), replacing the 1985 version.
There were a number of other noteworthy amendments to the IAA. In particular, section 21 of the IAA was repealed, which had the effect that parties could no longer contract out of the Model Law. The IAA now includes detailed provisions dealing with confidentiality and consolidation of proceedings, which apply if the parties expressly agree to them.
At the domestic arbitration level, uniform arbitration legislation based on the 2006 Model Law is now in operation in all states and territories of Australia, with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory. This uniform legislation is known as the Commercial Arbitration Acts (CAAs). The CAAs represent a significant step forward in modernising Australia’s domestic arbitration legislation, having brought it into alignment with the IAA at the federal level.
The CAAs include confidentiality provisions that apply unless the parties specifically opt out, and allow for an appeal from the arbitration award if certain preconditions are met. Further under the CAAs, the courts must stay court proceedings in the presence of an arbitration agreement, removing the courts’ discretion to stay proceedings that was previously available.
Australia has further entrenched the use of ADR processes through the enactment of the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth). This Act explicitly recognises that litigation should be a last resort in resolving disputes and requires parties to take ‘genuine steps’, such as mediation or direct negotiations, to resolve a civil dispute before court proceedings can be commenced.
Institutional Arbitration in Australia: ACICA
The Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA) is Australia’s premier international arbitration institution. ACICA has published its own set of arbitration rules, known as the ACICA Arbitration Rules 2005 (the ACICA Rules).
In 2011, the ACICA Rules were updated to include provisions relating to emergency arbitrators that enable the appointment of an emergency arbitrator in arbitrations that have commenced under the ACICA Rules, but in which a tribunal has not yet been appointed. Therefore, by accepting the ACICA Rules, parties also accept to be bound by the emergency rules and any decision of an emergency arbitrator. The power of the emergency arbitrator applies to all arbitrations conducted under the ACICA Rules, unless the parties expressly opt out of the regime in writing.
Also included in the 2011 amendments to the ACICA Rules are new provisions for ‘Application for Emergency Interim Measures of Protection’. These provide that the emergency arbitrator may grant any interim measures of protection on an emergency basis that he or she deems necessary and on such terms as he or she deems appropriate. Such emergency interim measures may take the form of an award or of an order that must be made in writing and must contain the date when it was made and reasons for the decision. These emergency procedures generally follow the same approach as the ACICA Rules on interim measures and will not prejudice a party’s right to apply to any competent court for interim measures.
Both these updates to the ACICA Rules have provided parties in cross-border disputes with a prompt and efficient option for obtaining urgent interlocutory relief before an arbitral tribunal is constituted.
ACICA is planning a wholesale update to the ACICA Rules in 2015. In late 2014, it released a draft of the ACICA Arbitration Rules 2015 that will update the 2005 Rules. Among the proposed changes is the ability for ACICA to consolidate two or more pending arbitrations in certain circumstances and provisions in respect of multi-party arbitrations under which an arbitral tribunal may join additional parties bound by the same arbitration agreement as the existing parties to the arbitration.
ACICA has also published a separate set of Expedited Arbitration Rules (ACICA Expedited Rules), of which the latest version was published in 2011. The ACICA Expedited Rules aim to provide arbitration that is quick, cost effective and fair, considering in particular the amounts in dispute and complexity of issues. These rules operate on an opt-in basis.
ACICA is based in Sydney and operates out of the Australian International Disputes Centre (AIDC). The AIDC houses leading ADR providers, which, in addition to ACICA, include the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) Australia, Australian Maritime and Transport Arbitration Commission (AMTAC) and the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC). The AIDC is a one-stop shop offering full ADR services working to ensure ADR processes deliver benefits including efficiency, certainty, expediency, enforceability and commercial privacy. The AIDC is available for ACICA, PCA, ICC, ICDR, LCIA, CIETAC, HKIAC, SIAC, AAA or any other arbitrations, mediations or other processes. In addition to state-of-the-art hearing facilities, the ADIC also provides all the necessary business support services, including case management and trust account administration provided by skilled and professional staff.
In 2014, the Perth Centre for Energy and Resources Arbitration (PCERA) was established as a not-for-profit centre for arbitration and expert determination specialised in administering dispute resolution in the energy and resources sector.
The PCERA is geographically located in Perth, Western Australia, which is a regional hub for Australian and Asian energy and resources projects. The PCERA boasts an institutional framework, the PCERA Arbitration Principles, that is designed to facilitate the efficient resolution of Energy and Resource Industry disputes. This framework is coupled with a specialised knowledge base drawn from an array of specialised arbitration practitioners. These qualities make the PCERA an attractive option for disputing parties in the energy and resources sector.
Primary sources of arbitration law
Legislative powers in Australia are divided between the Commonwealth of Australia, as the federal entity, and the six states and two territories.
Matters of international arbitration are governed by the IAA, which incorporates the 2006 Model Law. The Model Law provides for a flexible and arbitration-friendly legislative environment, granting parties ample freedom to tailor the procedure to their individual needs.
The IAA supplements the Model Law in several respects. Division 3, for example, contains provisions on the parties’ right to obtain subpoenas, requiring a person to produce certain documents or to attend examination before the arbitral tribunal. While these provisions apply unless the parties expressly opt out, there are other provisions (eg, those dealing with confidentiality or consolidation of proceedings) that only apply if the parties expressly opt in. The IAA also provides clarity to the meaning of the term ‘public policy’ for the purpose of articles 34 and 36 of the Model Law.
Part II of the IAA implements Australia’s obligations as a signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (New York Convention). Australia acceded to the New York Convention without reservation. Australia is also a signatory to the ICSID Convention, the implementation of which is contained in part IV of the IAA.
Domestic arbitration is governed by the relevant CAAs of each state or territory where the arbitration takes place. All states and territories, except the Australian Capital Territory, have passed uniform domestic arbitration legislation adopting the Model Law, ensuring that Australia has a largely consistent domestic and international arbitration legislative framework in line with the international benchmark.
For international arbitrations in Australia, the Model Law and the New York Convention require the arbitration agreement to be in writing. While article II(2) of the New York Convention requires an ‘agreement in writing’ to include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement signed by both parties or contained in an exchange of letters, the Model Law is more expansive, covering content recorded in any form. Under the IAA, the term ‘agreement in writing’ has the same meaning as under the New York Convention. Domestic arbitrations under the CAAs adopt the more expansive definition contained in the Model Law.
In the landmark decision of Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping  FCAFC 192, the Federal Court of Australia confirmed its position that an arbitration clause contained in an exchange of signed letters is sufficient to fulfil the written requirement. However, as the Federal Court pointed out in its decision in Seeley International Pty Ltd v Electra Air Conditioning BV  FCA 29, ambiguous drafting may still lead to unwanted results. In that case, the arbitration clause included a paragraph providing that nothing in the arbitration clause would prevent a party from ‘seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in the case of a material breach or threatened breach’ of the agreement. The Federal Court interpreted that paragraph to mean that the parties intended to preserve their right to seek injunctive or declaratory relief before a court. The court was assisted in its interpretation by the fact that the agreement also included a jurisdiction clause.
Under Australian law, arbitration agreements are not required to be mutual. They may confer a right to commence arbitration to one party only (see PMT Partners v Australian National Parks & Wildlife Service  HCA 36). Some standard form contracts, particularly in the construction industry and the banking and finance sector, still make use of this approach.
The issue of which disputes are arbitrable has not yet been fully resolved. Particularly in relation to competition, bankruptcy and insolvency matters, courts have occasionally refused to stay proceedings – without expressly holding that these matters are inherently not arbitrable. Instead, most court decisions have considered whether the scope of the arbitration agreement is broad enough to cover such a dispute (eg, ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia  NSWSC 896) in respect of claims arising under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
Considerations such as these commonly arise in relation to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), (formally known as the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA)), Australia’s competition and consumer protection legislation. In IBM Australia v National Distribution Services (1991) 22 NSWLR 466, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that certain consumer protection matters under the TPA are capable of settlement by arbitration. Further, the New South Wales Supreme Court in Francis Travel Marketing v Virgin Atlantic Airways (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, and the Federal Court in Hi-Fert v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers (1998) 159 ALR 142, confirmed that disputes based on misleading and deceptive conduct under section 52 of the TPA are arbitrable.
However, in Petersville v Peters (WA) (1997) ATPR 41-566 and Alstom Power v Eraring Energy (2004) ATPR 42-009, the Federal Court took a slightly different position. It held that disputes under part IV of the TPA for anti-competitive behaviour are more appropriately dealt with by the court, irrespective of the scope of the arbitration agreement. These decisions show that courts may be reluctant to allow the arbitrability of competition matters and may seek to preserve the courts’ jurisdiction to hear matters that have a public dimension.
Where multiple claims are brought by one party, but only some of which are capable of settlement by arbitration, the courts have approached this issue by staying court proceedings only for those claims it considers capable of settlement by arbitration (see Hi-Fert v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers (1998) 159 ALR 142).
There are very limited circumstances in which a third party who is not privy to the arbitration agreement may be a party to the arbitral proceedings. One situation in which this can occur is in relation to a parent company where a subsidiary is bound by an arbitration agreement, though this exception is yet to be finally settled by Australian courts. There is, however, authority suggesting that a third party can be bound by an arbitration agreement in the case of fraud or where a company structure is used to mask the real purpose of a parent company (see Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449).
Under the revised IAA, courts now have the power to issue subpoenas for the purpose of arbitral proceedings, requiring a third party to produce to the arbitral tribunal particular documents or to attend for examination before the arbitral tribunal (section 23(3) of the IAA).
Similarly, under the CAAs, a party may obtain a court order compelling a person to produce documents under section 27A.
The Arbitral tribunal
Appointment and qualification of arbitrators
Australian laws impose no special requirements with regard to the arbitrator’s professional qualifications, nationality or residence. However, arbitrators must be impartial and independent, and must disclose circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. The IAA clarifies that a justifiable doubt exists only where there is a real danger of bias of the arbitrator in conducting the arbitration.
Where the parties fail to agree on the number of arbitrators to be appointed, section 10 of the CAAs provides for a single arbitrator to be appointed while article 10 of the Model Law provides for the appointment of a three-member tribunal. The appointment process for arbitrators will generally be provided in the institutional arbitration rules, or within the arbitration agreement itself. For all other circumstances, article 11 of the Model Law and section 11 of the CAAs prescribe a procedure for the appointment of arbitrators.
Where the parties have not agreed upon an appointment procedure or where their appointment procedure fails, parties are able to seek the appointment of arbitrators for international arbitrations from ACICA. Pursuant to article 11(5) of the Model Law, any appointment made by ACICA is unreviewable by a court.
Furthermore, the emergency arbitrator provisions in the ACICA Rules enable the appointment of an emergency arbitrator in arbitrations commenced under the ACICA Rules but before the case is referred to an arbitral tribunal. The emergency procedure calls for ACICA to use its best endeavours to appoint the emergency arbitrator within one business day of its receipt of an application for emergency relief.
Arbitration law in Australia does not prescribe a special procedure for the appointment of arbitrators in multiparty disputes. If multiparty disputes are likely to arise under a contract, it is advisable to agree on a set of arbitration rules containing particular provisions for the appointment of arbitrators under those circumstances, such as those found under article 11 of the ACICA Rules.
Challenge of arbitrators
For arbitrations under the IAA and the CAAs, a party can challenge an arbitrator if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence. The parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging arbitrators. Failing such agreement, the Model Law and CAAs prescribe that the party must initially submit a challenge to the tribunal, and then may apply to a competent court if the challenge is rejected.
To remove arbitrators because of a perceived lack of independence and impartiality under the IAA and the CAAs, any challenge must demonstrate that there is a ‘real danger’ that the arbitrator is biased.
Power of arbitrator to act as mediator, conciliator or other non-arbitral intermediary
The CAAs contain provisions under section 27D to facilitate med-arb, a process whereby an arbitrator may act as a mediator or conciliator or other ‘non-arbitral intermediary’ to resolve the dispute. Med-arb may occur if the arbitration agreement provides for it or the parties have consented to it. Under the CAAs, an arbitrator who has acted as a mediator in mediation proceedings that have been terminated may not conduct subsequent arbitration proceedings in relation to the dispute unless all parties to the arbitration consent in writing.
Liability of arbitrators
The IAA and CAAs both provide that arbitrators are not liable for negligence in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in their capacity as arbitrators (with the exception of fraud). This exclusion is also reflected in article 44 of the ACICA Rules. There are no known cases where an arbitrator has been sued in Australia.
The arbitral procedure
The principle of party autonomy is held in high regard by Australian tribunals. As a result, arbitral procedure tends to vary significantly according to the particulars of the dispute and the needs of the parties involved.
Parties are generally free to tailor the arbitration procedure to their particular needs, provided they comply with fundamental principles of due process and natural justice. In doing so, the most significant requirement under the Model Law is that the parties are treated with equality and are afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case. This requirement cannot be derogated from, even by the parties’ agreement.
Australian courts have a strong history of supporting the autonomy of arbitral proceedings. Courts will generally interfere only if specifically requested to do so by a party or the tribunal, and only where the applicable law allows them to do so.
The courts’ powers under the Model Law, and therefore under the IAA, are very restricted. Under the Model Law, courts may:
- grant interim measures of protection (article 17J);
- appoint arbitrators where the parties or the two party-appointed arbitrators fail to agree on an arbitrator (articles 11(3) and 11(4));
- decide on a challenge of an arbitrator, if so requested by the challenging party (article 13(3));
- decide, upon request by a party, on the termination of a mandate of an arbitrator (article 14);
- decide on the jurisdiction of the tribunal, where the tribunal has ruled on a plea as a preliminary question and a party has requested the court to make a final determination on its jurisdiction (article 16(3));
- assist in the taking of evidence (article 27); and
- set aside an arbitral award (article 34(2)).
In addition to those functions prescribed in the Model Law, courts have additional powers granted by the IAA, including the power to issues subpoenas, as discussed above.
Domestically, courts also have limited power to intervene under the CAAs. These circumstances include:
- applications by a party to set aside or appeal against an award (sections 34 and 34A);
- where there is a failure to agree on the appointment of an arbitrator, the court may appoint an arbitrator at the request of a party (section 11);
- a challenge to an arbitrator (section 13);
- terminating the mandate of an arbitrator who is unable to perform the arbitrator’s functions (section 14);
- reviewing an arbitral tribunal’s decision regarding jurisdiction (section 16); and
- making orders in relation to the costs of an arborted arbitration (section 33D).
Under the Model Law, the arbitral tribunal is generally free to make any interim orders or grant interim relief as it deems necessary. Further, under the Model Law, courts may order interim measures irrespective of whether the arbitration is seated in that country. Courts also may enforce interim measures issued by a foreign arbitral tribunal (article 17H of the Model Law).
The CAAs contain detailed provisions dealing with interim measures in part 4A, including allowing courts to make interim awards unless the parties expressly intend otherwise and an obligation on courts to enforce interim measures granted in any state or territory, except in limited circumstances.
Stay of proceedings
Provided the arbitration agreement is drafted widely enough, Australian courts will stay proceedings in face of a valid arbitration agreement. Section 8 of the CAAs gives greater primacy to the arbitration agreement. So long as there is an arbitration agreement that is not null or void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, the court must refer the parties to arbitration. There is no scope for the court to exercise discretion so as not to enforce an arbitration agreement.
For international arbitrations, Australian courts support the autonomy of international arbitration and will stay court proceedings in the presence of a valid arbitration agreement broad enough to cover the dispute, assuming the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable. Courts will refuse a stay only if they find the arbitration agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed and may impose such conditions as they think fit in ordering a stay.
Similarly, article 8 of the Model Law mandates a stay of proceedings where there is a valid arbitration agreement. A party must request the stay before making its first substantive submissions. Although the issue of the relationship between article 8 of the Model Law and section 7 of the IAA has not been settled by the courts, the prevailing opinion among arbitration practitioners is that a party can make a stay application under either of the two provisions (this also seems to reflect the position of the Federal Court in Shanghai Foreign Trade Corporation v Sigma Metallurgical Company (1996) 133 FLR 417).
The IAA is expressly subject to section 11 of the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1991 (Cth), which renders void an arbitration agreement contained in a bill of lading or similar document relating to the international carriage of goods to and from Australia, unless the designated seat of the arbitration is in Australia. There are also statutory provisions in Australia’s insurance legislation that render void an arbitration agreement unless it has been concluded after the dispute has arisen.
There is great flexibility regarding legal representation in international arbitrations under the IAA and domestic arbitrations under the CAAs. In either situation, parties may elect to either represent themselves or choose to be represented by a legal practitioner or any other person. There is no equivalent provision in the Model Law.
Confidentiality of proceedings
Australian courts have taken a somewhat controversial approach to confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. In the well-known decision in Esso Australia Resources v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, the High Court of Australia held that while arbitral proceedings and hearings are private in the sense that they are not open to the general public, this does not mean that all documents voluntarily produced by a party during the proceedings are confidential. In other words, confidentiality is not inherent in the fact that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. However, the court noted that it is open to the parties to agree that documents are to be kept confidential.
The IAA now includes certain opt-in provisions dealing in detail with the confidentiality of different aspects of arbitral proceedings (sections 23C-G of the IAA). These provisions deal with the circumstances in which confidential information may be disclosed and the process for such disclosure, as well as the circumstances in which courts and tribunals may allow or prohibit disclosure. Since these provisions operate on an opt-in basis, it is advisable to agree to their application in the arbitration agreement to ensure confidentiality is preserved.
Evidentiary procedure in Australian arbitrations is largely influenced by the common law system. Arbitrators in international and domestic arbitration proceedings are not bound by the rules of evidence, and may determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence with considerable freedom (article 19(2) of the Model Law and section 19(3) of the CAAs).
Although arbitrators enjoy great freedom in the taking of evidence, in practice, arbitrators in international proceedings will often refer to the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence (the IBA Rules). The ACICA Rules also recommend the adoption of the IBA Rules in the absence of any express agreement between the parties and the arbitrator.
The situation is slightly different in domestic arbitrations. Despite the liberties conferred by section 19(3) of the CAAs, many arbitrators still conduct arbitrations similarly to court proceedings: namely, witnesses are sworn in, examined and cross-examined. Nevertheless, arbitrators are more and more frequently adopting procedures that suit the particular circumstances of the case and that allow for more efficient proceedings.
For arbitrations governed by the IAA, article 27 of the Model Law allows an arbitrator to seek the court’s assistance in the taking of evidence. In such case, a court will usually apply its own rules for the taking of evidence.
Form of the award
The proceedings are formally ended with the issuing of a final award. The Model Law and the CAAs contain similar form requirements that awards must meet (see article 31 of the Model Law and section 31 of the CAAs).
The Model Law and the CAAs do not prescribe time limits for delivery of the award and delays in rendering an award do not result in the termination of the arbitral proceedings. Despite this, a party may apply to a court to terminate an arbitrator’s mandate on the basis that the arbitrator is unable to perform his function or fails to act without undue delay (article 14(1) of the Model Law).
Under Article 29 of the Model Law, any decision of the arbitral tribunal must be made by a majority of its members, but the presiding arbitrator may decide procedural questions if authorised by the parties or the arbitral tribunal.
Recourse against award
The only available avenue for recourse against international awards is to set aside the award (article 34(2) of the Model Law). The grounds for setting aside an award mirror those for refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention, and essentially require a violation of due process or a breach of public policy. The term ‘public policy’ in article 34 of the Model Law is qualified in section 19 of the IAA and requires some kind of fraud, corruption or breach of natural justice in the making of the award. The Model Law does not contemplate any right to appeal for errors of law.
In 2014, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd  FCAFC 83 held that an international arbitral award will not be set aside or denied enforcement under the Model Law for a breach of the rules of natural justice unless real unfairness or real practical injustice in the conduct of the dispute resolution process is demonstrated by reference to established principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The Full Court also rejected the notion that minor or technical breaches of the rules of natural justice would suffice for the setting aside or non-enforcement of an international arbitral award in Australia.
Further, the Federal Court’s decision in Uganda Telecom Pty Ltd v Hi Tech Telecom Pty Ltd  FCA 131 reinforced the finality of arbitral awards and Australia’s pro-enforcement policy by holding that there is no general discretion to refuse enforcement; and the public policy ground for refusing enforcement under the Act should be interpreted narrowly and should not give rise to any sort of residual discretion.
Most recently, in William Hare UAE LLC v Aircraft Support Industries Pty Ltd  NSWSC 1403, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that where parts of an award are affected by a breach of the rules of natural justice in respect of one aspect of an arbitration, the infected parts of the award can be severed and the balance of the award enforced in accordance with section 8 of the IAA. This decision reflects the strongly pro-enforcement attitude of Australian courts to enforcing arbitral awards.
The same grounds for setting aside an award apply domestically. However, the CAAs also permit an appeal of an award on a question of law in limited circumstances (section 34A). Such an appeal is only possible with the leave of the court or if the parties agree to the appeal before the end of the appeal period. Further, the court must be satisfied that the following requirements are satisfied:
- the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties;
- the question is one which the arbitral tribunal was asked to determine;
- the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong (or is one of general public importance); and
- despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.
The confinement of challenges under the IAA and CAAs strictly to those grounds set out in the Acts was confirmed recently by the Federal Court in Beijing Be Green Import & Export Co Ltd v Elders International Australia Pty Ltd  FCA 1375. In that case the applicant was unsuccessful in seeking a stay of the execution of a money judgment of a CIETAC award, pending determination of separate CIETAC arbitral proceedings. The applicant sought a stay on the ground that the award in the latter proceedings would constitute a substantial set-off of the money judgment. The Court held that this ground did not warrant a stay and the respondent was entitled to the fruits of the arbitral process into which the parties had freely entered.
Often, in practice, the most important moment for a party that has obtained an award is the enforcement stage. Australia has acceded to the New York Convention without reservation. It should be noted, however, that the IAA creates a quasi-reservation in that it requires a party seeking enforcement of an award made in a nonConvention country to be domiciled in, or to be an ordinary resident of, a Convention country. So far, no cases have been reported where this requirement was tested against the somewhat broader obligations under the New York Convention and, given the ever-increasing number of Convention countries, the likelihood that this requirement will become of practical relevance is decreasing.
Section 8 of the IAA implements Australia’s obligations under article V of the New York Convention and provides for foreign awards to be enforced in the courts of a state or territory as if the award had been made in that state or territory and in accordance with the laws of that state or territory. For awards made within Australia, either article 35 of the Model Law for international arbitration awards, or section 35 of the CAAs for domestic awards, applies.
In 2013, the High Court of Australia in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia & Anor  HCA 5 confirmed that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to enforce international arbitral awards and that the powers exercised by an arbitral tribunal are not in contravention of the Australian Constitution.
From an Australian perspective, the opening of foreign markets, especially in Asia, is also increasing the significance of the protection of foreign direct investment under the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 (the ICSID Convention). While the number of investment arbitrations involving Australian parties is expected to increase significantly over the next decade, the level of awareness about the availability of investment protection under investment treaties still needs to be raised.
Australia continues to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) actively. Australia has entered into FTAs with New Zealand, Chile, the United States, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and is a party to the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA. Significantly, in 2014, Australia concluded FTAs with China, Japan and Korea, representing Australia’s three largest export markets. Further FTAs are currently under negotiation with India, Indonesia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, in addition to the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).
Following a brief period of reluctance towards including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in its BITs and FTAs, in recent years Australia has been more willing to incorporate these provisions. The recently concluded FTAs with China and Korea incorporated ISDS provisions including requirements that Australian investors must be treated fairly and equitably, and prohibit discrimination against foreign investments in favour of domestic investments. The FTA with Japan does not include ISDS provisions but it does contain a review clause providing for future consideration of ISDS provisions.