Investment Treaty Arbitration: Luxembourg

[Model BIT] (2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

[Model BIT] (2019)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Energy Charter Treaty (16 April 1998 for Luxembourg; 6 August 1998 for Belgium)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3 months

Yes

Yes

Albania (18 October 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Algeria (13 February 1992)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Argentina (20 May 1994)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

None

Yes

Yes

Armenia (19 December 2003)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Azerbaijan (27 May 2009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Bahrain (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Bangladesh (15 September 1987)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

Yes

Yes

Barbados (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3 months

Yes

Yes

Belarus (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Benin (30 August 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Bolivia (10 January 2004; terminated on 10 January 2014)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Bosnia and Herzegovina (16 September 2010)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Botswana (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Brazil (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Bulgaria (29 May 1991)*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Burkina Faso (13 January 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Burundi (12 September 1993)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

No

Yes

Cameroon (1 November 1981)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Chile (5 August 1999)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

China (5 October 1986; terminated on 1 December 2009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

China (1 December 2009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Colombia (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

7 months[2]

Yes

Yes

Comoros (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Congo, Democratic Republic of (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Costa Rica (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Côte d'Ivoire (15 June 2013)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Croatia (29 December 2003)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3 months

Yes

Yes

Cuba (not in force)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Cyprus (5 June 1999)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Czechia[3] (13 February 1992)*

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Egypt (28 February 1977, terminated)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

None

No

Yes

Egypt (29 May 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

El Salvador (18 November 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Estonia (23 October 1999)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Ethiopia (not in force)^[4]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Gabon (28 May 2005)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

12 months

Yes

Yes

Georgia (3 July 1999)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Guatemala (1 September 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Hong Kong (18 June 2001)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Hungary (28 September 1988)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

India (8 January 2001; terminated on 22 March 2017)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Indonesia (17 June 1972) (expired) (concluded by Belgium alone)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

None

No

Yes

Iran (not in force) (concluded by Luxembourg alone)^[5]

N/a

N/a

N/a

N/a

N/a

N/a

N/a

N/a

Kazakhstan (6 February 2001)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Korea, Republic of (27 March 2011)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

(None for local courts)

Yes

Yes

Kuwait (8 December 2003)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Latvia (4 April 1999)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Lebanon (5 March 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Liberia (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Libya (8 December 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Lithuania (6 September 1999)^*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Madagascar (29 November 2008)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Malaysia (9 February 1982)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

No

Yes

Malta (15 June 1993)*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

18 months

Yes

Yes

Mauritania (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

No

Yes

Mauritius (16 December 2009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Mexico (14 March 2003)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months^[6]

(None for local courts)

Yes

Yes

Moldova (20 April 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Mongolia (15 April 2000)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Montenegro (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Morocco (18 October 1967, terminated)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

None

No

No

Morocco (29 May 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Mozambique (1 September 2009)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Nicaragua (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

North Macedonia (4 November 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Oman (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

Yes

Yes

Pakistan (7 August 2015)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Panama (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Paraguay (9 January 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Peru (12 September 2008)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Philippines (19 December 2003)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Poland (2 August 1991)^[7]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Qatar (30 April 2014)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Romania (9 March 2001)^*

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Romania (1 May 1980; terminated on 9 March 2001)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

None

Yes

Yes

Russian Federation (13 October 1991)^[8]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Rwanda (1 August 1985)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

18 months

(None for local courts)

Yes

Yes

Rwanda (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Saudi Arabia (11 June 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Serbia (12 August 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Singapore (27 November 1980)^[9]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3 months

No

Yes

Slovakia^[10] (13 February 1992)*

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Slovenia (14 January 2002)*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

South Africa (14 March 2003; terminated on 7 September 2012)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Sri Lanka (26 April 1984)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

No

Yes

Sudan (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Tajikistan (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Thailand (19 September 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Togo (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Tunisia (9 March 1966, terminated)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

None

No

No

Tunisia (18 October 2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Turkey (4 May 1990)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

1 year
(None for local courts)

Yes

Yes

Uganda (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Ukraine (27 January 2001)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

United Arab Emirates (10 November 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Uruguay (23 April 1999)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months (for local courts)

Yes

Yes

Uzbekistan (6 February 2001)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Venezuela (29 April 2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

Vietnam (11 June 1999)^[11]

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

No

Yes

Yemen (11 June 1999)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6 months

Yes

Yes

Zambia (not in force)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

6 months

Yes

Yes

The information contained in this table is publicly available at the following sources: UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub (investmentpolicy.unctad.org) accessed 20 June 2022; ICSID (icsid.worldbank.org) accessed 20 June 2022; the treaty database of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomatie.belgium.be/fr/traites/base-de-donnees-des-traites); the Official Journal of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (legilux.public.lu).

The scope of ‘natural person’ as investor

Typically, BLEU BITs require a natural person to be a citizen/national according to Belgian or Luxembourg legislation.

The ECT also extends investor protection to natural persons who permanently reside in Belgium or Luxembourg.

BLEU BITs do not exclude dual nationals from their scope, save for the Colombia BIT.

The Singapore BIT includes partnership firms or limited partnerships and other associations without legal personality in the definition of investor.

The scope of ‘legal person’ as investor

BLEU BITs normally require that Belgian and Luxembourg legal persons be incorporated in accordance with the laws of their home state and have their seat or registered office in Belgium or Luxembourg.

Notable exceptions are the Chile, Colombia, Congo and Croatia BITs. These BITs require that the legal persons also pursue real, effective or substantial economic or business activities in Belgium or Luxembourg.

Corporate forms of a ‘legal person’ as investor

BLEU BITs do not normally list the types of legal persons qualifying as investors. The Korea, Kuwait, Pakistan and Singapore BITs provide a non-exhaustive list. The Costa Rica BIT explicitly includes non-profit organisations.

The Kuwait, Qatar and UAE BITs explicitly include the state, governmental agencies and state-owned entities of Belgium and Luxembourg in the definition of ‘investor’.

Investor’s control in a third-party company

The China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and Thailand BITs explicitly provide protection to investments where the Belgian or Luxembourg investor holds and controls its investment through a company incorporated in a country non-party to the BIT. This benefit is, however, subject to conditions in some of these BITs.

The Barbados BIT treats companies incorporated under Belgian or Luxembourg law but effectively controlled by Barbados nationals as investors of Barbados.

The ECT contains a denial-of-benefits clause that allows Belgium and Luxembourg to deny, under certain conditions, the benefits of the ECT to entities and investments owned by nationals of countries that are not parties to the ECT.

Restrictions to multiple treaty claims

Only some BITs (eg, the Morocco and Slovenia BITs) explicitly preclude investors from bringing certain claims under the BIT insofar as they have brought the same claim under the BIT of another country.

Scope of ‘assets’

Typically, BLEU BITs provide a broad definition of an investment that refers to ‘every kind of asset’. More recent BITs define investments as assets and contributions to investments made into ‘any sector of economic activity’ (eg, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Uzbekistan, Venezuela or Vietnam BITs). Some BITs require investments to be made ‘in view of establishing sustainable economic links’ (Mexico BIT), as medium or long-term contributions intended for the development of economic activity acknowledged to be in the national interest (Rwanda BIT), or as requiring the assumption of reasonable risk (Colombia BIT).

Few BITs also provide for the law of the host state to determine the 'content and scope of rights' of the assets listed as qualified investments (eg, the Argentina and Gabon BITs).

The Sri Lanka BIT protects only investments made in Sri Lanka that have been ‘specifically approved in writing’ by Sri Lanka.

Exclusion of certain assets

Only a few BLEU BITs explicitly exclude certain assets from their scope (Mexico and Peru BITs).

The Colombia BIT explicitly excludes investments made with ‘capital or assets derived from illegal activities’.

Change of legal form after the initial investment

BLEU BITs usually contain a provision explicitly granting protection to an investment despite its change of form after the initial investment. BLEU BITs without such a provision are rare (eg, the Bangladesh BIT). Several BITs only extend the protection to those investments provided that the change of form is not contrary to the law of the host state or has been approved by the relevant authorities (eg, the Colombia, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Tunisia and UAE BITs).

Legality of investment

Several BLEU BITs contain provisions limiting protection only to lawful investments. Those provisions are often explicitly included within the definition of ‘investment’ itself (eg, Albania, Argentina, China (2005), Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Liberia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, North Macedonia, Oman, Philippines, Rwanda (1983), Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Yemen BITs).

Commencement of coverage

BLEU BITs usually contain a provision granting protection to investments made prior to the entry into force of the BIT or the retroactive beginning of the investment protection. In several instances, such protection is subject to a condition regarding the investment’s legality (eg, Azerbaijan, Benin, Georgia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Qatar BITs). Several BITs, however, do not apply to disputes that arose prior to the BIT’s entry into force (eg, Egypt, Guatemala, Peru and Zambia BITs).

Illustration of the FET standard

The vast majority of the BLEU BITs and the ECT provide that investments made by investors of a contracting party on the territory of the other contracting party shall be accorded ‘fair and equitable treatment’, without any definition being given.

A majority of such treaties also provide that this treatment shall not be less favourable than that accorded to investors of any third state/of the most favoured nation and, in no case, less favourable than the treatment ‘recognized under international law’. Some such treaties (eg, the Albania, Brazil, Burundi and Chile BITs) add that the treatment cannot be less favourable than that accorded to the host state’s own investors.

International law/Customary international law

Some of the BLEU BITs define the FET standard by reference to international law or customary international law. For instance

• The Colombia BIT provides that investments shall ‘enjoy at all times, in accordance with customary international law, fair and equitable treatment’. It also clarifies, ‘for greater certainty’, that the concept of FET does not require ‘additional treatment to that required under the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in accordance with the standard of customary international law and general principles of law embodied in the main legal systems of the world’.
• The Kuwait BIT provides that investment shall be accorded FET ‘in accordance with principles of international law and the provisions of this Agreement’.
• The Liberia BIT provides that FET shall be ‘in accordance with the principles of international law’.
• The Pakistan BIT provides that FET ‘shall be consistent with the universally recognised principles of international law’.
• The Peru BIT provides that FET shall be ‘in accordance with customary international law’.
• The Turkey BIT provides that FET shall be ‘in accordance with international law principles’.
• The Venezuela BIT provides that FET shall be ‘according to international law’.

Additional clarifications

Some BITs provide clarifications as to the substantive content of the FET standard:

• The BITs with Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Singapore provide that investments will benefit from FET, precluding any illegitimate or unjustified or discriminatory measures that may hinder their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal.

Exclusions

Most BLEU BITs provide that the protections encompassed under the FET standard do not cover the rights and privileges that a contracting party (the BLEU) accords to investors of a third state as a result of its participation in, or association with, a free trade zone, a customs union, a common market or other regional economic organisation.¹²

Some BITs (eg, the Albania, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and Cyprus BITs) also provide that the protections provided under the FET standard do not apply to tax matters.

The Rwanda BIT provides that the FET standard does not extend to benefits that may be conferred by a contracting party on a neighbouring country or a third developing country.

MFN treatment

Many of the BLEU BITs (eg, Cuba, Estonia and Lebanon BITs) provide that, for matters dealt with in the respective article regarding expropriation, investors shall be granted treatment no less favourable than that accorded to investors of any third state, and not lower than that recognised under international law.

Expropriation for a public purpose

Most of the BLEU BITs provide that expropriation is only possible for a public purpose, for national security or national interest, or, more generally, in the public interest.

The Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Kuwait and South Africa BITs require that the public purpose be related to the internal needs of that contracting party.

However, a few BITs do not refer to a public purpose at all when setting out the conditions for a lawful expropriation (eg, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Liberia BITs).

Valuation date for lawful expropriations

Most of the BLEU BITs provide that the valuation date for purposes of calculating compensation is the day before the expropriatory measures were taken or were otherwise made public.

However, some BITs provide that the valuation date is the date of the actual expropriation or when the expropriation was made public (the Bangladesh, Romania, and Singapore BITs) or during the ‘period’ immediately preceding the measure (the Mexico BIT).

Calculation of compensation

The BLEU BITs and the ECT provide that compensation shall be equal to the ‘actual’ (eg, the Botswana BIT), ‘real’ (eg, the Chile BIT), ‘effective’ (eg, the Cuba BIT), ‘full’ (eg, the Bangladesh BIT), ‘commercial’ (eg, the Albania BIT), ‘market’ (eg, the Colombia BIT) or ‘fair market’ value (eg, the ECT) of the expropriated investment.

Interest is usually set at a normal commercial rate. However, some BITs contain specific provisions regarding the level of interest:

• The Algeria BIT provides that interest shall be equal to the official rate for the Special Drawing Rights, as set by the IMF; and
• The Brazil, Lithuania and North Macedonia BITs refer to LIBOR

The Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Mexico, Kuwait, Oman and UAE BITs contain detailed provisions on the valuation of the lawfully expropriated investment and the calculation of compensation.

Protection of minority shareholders

Many of the BLEU BITs (eg, Hong Kong, India, Kuwait, Malaysia BITs) provide that the provisions on expropriation apply by analogy to situations where a contracting party expropriates the assets of a company established in that state and in which investors of the other contracting party own shares. This is usually for the purpose, and to the extent necessary, to ensure just and equitable compensation.

Indirect expropriation

The Colombia BIT defines indirect expropriation as resulting from a measure or series of measures having an equivalent effect to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. It also provides criteria for determining whether a measure or series of measures constitute indirect expropriation.

Article IX(3)(c) of the Colombia BIT codifies the contracting parties’ right to regulate in the public interest, providing that: ‘except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied for public purposes or with objectives such as public health, safety and environment protection, do not constitute indirect expropriation’.

Scope

All of the BLEU BITs and the ECT contain national treatment and MFN clauses:

• some BITs contain both general MFN clauses as well as MFN clauses that apply to specific standards of treatment (eg, the Algeria BIT contains MFN clauses that apply to the FET and FPS standards, to the expropriation standard, to the provisions on transfers, as well as a general MFN clause that applies ‘[i]n all matters relating to the treatment of investments’);
• other BITs contain only MFN clauses that apply to specific standards of treatment but no general MFN clause (eg, the Albania BIT contains MFN clauses that apply to the FET and FPS standard, the expropriation standard, the provisions on free transfers and as regards exchange rates for transfers, but no generally applicable MFN clause); and
• few BITs contain only general MFN clauses that apply to the entire treaty (eg, the Russia BIT contains an MFN clause that applies ‘in all matters governed by this Agreement’).

The scope of the clauses is relatively varied. They apply to investments (eg, Albania and Algeria BITs), investors (eg, Argentina, Armenia and Mongolia BITs), investors as regards the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments (eg, Armenia, Mauritius and Panama BITs) or to returns of investors (eg, Barbados, Hong Kong and Oman BITs).

Some clauses require that the investment or investor be situated in ‘like circumstances’ with the national or third state investment or investor in order for the better treatment to be accorded (eg, the Colombia and Kuwait BITs).

Common limitations

Most BLEU BITs (eg, the Korea, Lebanon and Mauritius BITs) provide that the protections encompassed under the national treatment and/or most favoured nation treatment clauses or, more generally, under the BITs, do not cover the rights and privileges that a contracting party (the BLEU) accords to investors of a third state as a result of its participation in, or association with, a free trade zone, a customs union, a common market or other regional economic organisation.

Limitation on NT and MFN obligations

Some BITs (eg, the Argentina, Armenia and Bahrain BITs) also provide that the protections provided under the NT/MFN clauses do not apply to tax matters.

The Rwanda BIT provides that the MFN clause does not extend to benefits that may be conferred by a contracting party on a neighbouring country or a third developing country.

The Botswana BIT carves out from the national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment clause any ‘incentives, treatment, preferences or privileges through special policies or measures’ that a contracting party may grant to its nationals only for the purpose of promoting small and medium-sized enterprises and infant industries.

The ECT carves out the protection of intellectual property from the scope of application of these clauses.

Extensions to the whole treaty

Very few BITs expressly define the scope of application of national treatment and/or most-favoured nation treatment clauses. However, the Barbados BIT provides that the clauses apply to articles 1 to 15 of the BIT (investor-state dispute settlement being provided at article 8).

Some BITs include MFN or NT clauses with a very large scope of application:

• ‘in all matters relating to the treatment of investments’ (eg, the Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, El Salvador and North Macedonia BITs); and
• ‘all issues dealt with in this Agreement’ (eg, the Argentina, Gabon and Georgia BITs).

Scope

The ‘protection and security’ standard is included in most of the BLEU BITs and the ECT. There are, however, some exceptions (eg, Cuba, India and Romania BITs).

There is considerable divergence in the language employed in these treaties as regards this standard. The more commonly used expressions of the standard are ‘continuous protection and security’ (as in the 2002 Model BIT) or ‘constant protection and security’. There are, however, a limited number of treaties where the phrase ‘full protection and security’ is used (eg, Bangladesh, Barbados, Oman, Mozambique, Hong Kong and Croatia BITs).

Most treaties follow the 2002 Model BIT and have a carve-out for ‘measures required to maintain public order’. They also expand on the meaning of the standard by suggesting that it excludes ‘any unjustified or discriminatory measure which could hinder, either in law or in practice, the management, maintenance, use, possession or liquidation thereof’.   

Links to other standards

In the BLEU BITs, the ‘protection and security’ standard is not generally linked to international law or other standards under the treaty. There are, however, some exceptions where the ‘protection and security’ standard is linked to one or more other standards as below

• Some BITs (eg, the Colombia and Peru BITs) equate the ‘protection and security’ standard with customary international law.
• Some BITs (eg, the Sri Lanka and Bulgaria BITs) link the ‘protection and security’ standard to the standard enjoyed by investments belonging to the most favoured nation investors.
• Some BITs (eg, the Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Guatemala and Uruguay BITs) provide that the protection offered shall at least be equal to that enjoyed by investors of a third State and shall in no case be less favourable than those recognised under international law.
• Some BITs (eg, the Thailand and North Macedonia BITs) require the contracting party to accord at least the same security and protection that it gives to its own nationals or legal persons of any third state. However, in no case can the treatment be less favourable than that recognised by international law.

It is noteworthy that in instances where the ‘protection and security’ standard is linked to the most favoured nation standard, some treaties (eg, the Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and North Macedonia BITs) provide that such protection shall not cover the privileges granted by one contracting party to the investors of a third state pursuant to its participation in or association with a free trade zone, a customs union, a common market or any other form of regional economic organisation.

Qualification of the obligation

The umbrella clauses in the BLEUs BITs are formulated differently.

In majority of the BITs, the contracting party ‘undertakes to ensure at all times that the commitments it has entered into vis-a-vis investors of the other Contracting Party shall be observed’.

In some BITs (eg, the Thailand, Mozambique Hong Kong and Korea BITs), the obligation to observe any obligation is limited to those made with regard to investments made by investors of the other contracting party.

Some treaties provide for different dispute resolution mechanisms when the umbrella clause is invoked. The ECT allows contracting states to withhold unconditional consent to arbitration in respect of a dispute arising in respect of the umbrella clause. The India BIT provides that the investor-state dispute settlement procedure under the treaty will apply only in the absence of ordinary domestic legal remedies. The Mexico BIT provides that disputes resulting from the umbrella clause obligations will be settled in accordance with the provisions of the specific agreement on which the said obligations are based.

Both the 2002 and 2019 Model BITs have provisions on the free transfer of payments.

Article 6(1) of the 2002 BLEU Model BIT ‘guarantees’ to investors the free transfer of all payments relating to an investment. This includes: ‘a) amounts necessary for establishing, maintaining or expanding the investment; b) amounts necessary for payments under a contract […]; c) returns from investments; d) proceeds from the total or partial liquidation of investments […]; [and] e) compensation paid pursuant to Article 5 [the provision related to expropriation]’.

Article 6(2) grants working nationals of the other contracting party the right to transfer ‘an appropriate portion of their earnings to their country of origin.’

Article 6(3) requires the transfers to be in 'freely convertible currency at the rate applicable on the day transfers are made to spot transactions in the currency used’.

Article 6(4) requires contracting parties to 'issue the authorisations required to ensure that the transfers can be made without undue delay’.

Finally, article 6(5) provides that the guarantees referred to in article 6 shall ‘at least be equal to those granted to the investors of the most favoured nation’.

Article 10 of the 2019 BLEU Model BIT, dealing with transfers, is more comprehensive than the above provision. It, however, contains a carve-out in article 10(5), which provides:

‘Notwithstanding the above paragraphs of this article, nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the Contracting Party from applying in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner its laws relating to:

• bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors;
• issuing, trading or dealing in securities;
• criminal or penal offences;
• financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities;
• social security, public retirement and compulsory savings programmes; or
• ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.’

Most of the BLEU BITs and the ECT contain a provision requiring the contracting parties to permit investors to freely transfer investments and investment returns.

In some of the treaties, this protection is subject to the host state’s right to adopt measures (i) to regulate balance of payments difficulties; (ii) when the movement of capital causes or could cause serious difficulties in macroeconomic management, particularly in terms of the monetary and exchange rate policy; (iii) in the event of bankruptcy or to protect the rights of creditors; (iv) to ensure compliance with laws on the issuing, trading and dealing in securities; (v) to ensure the satisfaction of judgements in civil, administrative and criminal adjudicatory proceedings; and (vi) to ensure compliance with tax and labour laws. The Argentina, Chile, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Colombia BITs and the ECT are some examples with one or more of the above-mentioned carveouts.

Some treaties (eg, the Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Comoros BITs) provide that the ‘guarantees’ in the ‘free transfer of payments’ provision ‘shall at least be equal to those granted to investors of the most favoured nation’.

Others (eg, the Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Sri Lanka and Paraguay BITs) provide that the ‘guarantees’ in the ‘free transfer of payments’ provision shall at least be equal to those granted to investors of the most favoured nation in a similar situation.

In some instances (eg, the Bolivia, Argentina and Cameroon BITs), the treaty also provides that the exchange rate at which the transfer takes place shall be ‘fair and equitable’ and no less favourable than those granted to investors of the most-favoured nation.

There is no separate non-impairment provision in either the 2002 or 2019 Model BIT.

A limited number of BLEU BITs (eg, the Hong Kong, Barbados and Bangladesh BITs and the ECT) include a separate obligation not to impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, expansion, sale or liquidation of investments of nationals or companies of the other contracting party.

The Hong Kong and Bangladesh BITs, as well as the ECT, use the expression ‘unreasonable or discriminatory’ measures.

The Barbados BIT uses the expression ‘arbitrary or discriminatory’ measures. It also has a carve-out for ‘measures required to maintain public order or public safety’.

Article 5(4) of the 2002 Model BIT obliges a contracting party to grant investors whose investments have suffered losses owing to ‘war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of national emergency or revolt in the territory of the other Contracting Party’ treatment, as ‘regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement’ equal to that which the contracting party ‘grants to the investors of the most favoured nation’.

In contrast, the 2019 Model BIT is more comprehensive.

Article 9(1) of the 2019 Model BIT contains a provision similar to article 5(4) referred to above. What is noteworthy, however, is that it provides for treatment ‘no less favourable than that accorded to its own investors or to investors of any third country, whichever is more favourable to the investor concerned’.

Article 9(2) elaborates that ‘[n]otwithstanding paragraph 1’ if an investor suffers a loss in the territory of the host contracting party due to ‘(a) requisitioning of its investment or part thereof by the latter’s forces or authorities; or (b) destruction of its investment or part thereof by the latter’s forces or authorities, which was not required by the necessity of the situation’ then the host contracting party shall provide the investor restitution or compensation which shall be ‘prompt, appropriate and effective and paid without undue delay’.

Most of the BLEU BITs include a provision for the compensation of losses arising out of armed conflict and civil unrest similar to the formulation prescribed in the 2002 Model BIT. Only few BITs (eg, the Oman and Croatia BITs and the ECT) bear greater resemblance to the 2019 Model BIT.

As can be seen in the 2002 Model BIT, these treaties typically provide that the ‘treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, [shall be] at least equal to that which the latter Contracting Party grants to the investors of the most favoured nation.’

There are, however, a few instances (eg, the Albania, Egypt and Gabon BITs) where, like paragraph 1 of the 2019 Model BIT, a reference is also made to the national treatment obligation.

Cooling-off period

Typically, BLEU BITs provide for a cooling-off period of six months (sometimes three months but rarely more) before an investor can bring its claim to the local courts or to international arbitration.

Choice of arbitration institutions

As indicated above, most BLEU BITs provide for a choice of arbitration institutions and rules. With few exceptions (eg, the Hong Kong BIT), arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Convention and Rules is a standard feature of the BLEU BITs. Rarely, however, is ICSID arbitration the only available option (eg, the Bangladesh BIT).

Occasionally, options include arbitration pursuant to the rules of a local or regional institution (eg, the Colombia, Egypt and Oman BITs), or regional international institutions such as the OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (Togo BIT) or the Arab Investment Tribunal (Oman BIT). In addition to ICSID and ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, the Kuwait BIT allows the parties to select any arbitration rules that they can agree upon.

Applicable law and seat of arbitration

Typically, the arbitral tribunal should decide on the basis of the national law, including the rules relating to conflicts of law, of the state party to the dispute, the provisions of the BIT, the terms of a specific agreement that may have been entered into regarding the investment, and the principles of international law.

The 2019 Model BIT and some BITs, (eg, the Barbados, Colombia, Kuwait, Mexico, Mozambique, and Thailand BITs) require with respect to arbitrations, other than arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Rules, that the seat be situated in the territory of a party to the 1958 New York Convention.

Consolidation of pending proceedings

The 2019 Model BIT and the Mexico and Peru BITs provide, in some circumstances, a procedure for the consolidation two or more related pending arbitration proceedings.

Restrictions on right to refer to arbitration

Several BITs require the investor to resort to local courts for a certain amount of time before international arbitration becomes available (eg, the Argentina, Rwanda (1983) and Uruguay BITs (all 18 months), the Botswana BIT (six months), the Romania BIT of 1980 (two years), the UAE BIT (15 months, or six months if both parties to the dispute agree to proceed to arbitration)).

Only a few BITs require the exhaustion of local remedies. Thus, the 2005 China BIT requires BLEU investors in China to exhaust a specific local non-judicial remedy before resorting to international arbitration. China declared that the relevant procedure will not exceed three months. The Colombia BIT requires investors of both parties to exhaust local administrative remedies prior to resorting to arbitration. However, the procedure cannot exceed six months.

Some BITs offer the option for the investor to pursue its claim before the courts and in international arbitration consecutively. If that option is exercised, the investor is required to pursue the court proceedings for a certain amount of time, eg, 18 months in the case of the Chile and Paraguay BITs.

Furthermore, some BITs exclude some matters from arbitration, such as taxation (eg, the Bangladesh BIT). Some BITs with socialist countries confer jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals only with respect to disputes regarding expropriations or the amount of compensation for expropriations (eg, the Bulgaria, China (1984), Hungary, Poland, Romania (1978) and Russia BITs).

Fork-in-the-road provisions

BLEU BITs normally provide for the submission of investor-state disputes to the local courts or to international arbitration.

Several BITS include explicit fork-in-the-road provisions (eg, the China (2005), Costa Rica, India, Mexico, Oman, the Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela BITs. Some BITs allow investors to submit a dispute to international arbitration where it has initiated proceedings before the courts, provided that the court has not ruled on the merits and the investors withdraws its claim (eg, the Brazil and Mexico BITs).

The South Korea and Kuwait BITs explicitly allow investors to pursue summary relief orders, excluding damages, in local courts in parallel to arbitration proceedings. By contrast, other BITs such as the Rwanda (1983), Argentina and Uruguay BITs, require both parties to the dispute to take all necessary steps to withdraw any legal proceedings pending before the courts.

Limitation periods

Only exceptionally do BLEU BITs include a time limitation period for investors to initiate proceedings. Such limitation periods typically range from three years (Mexico and Peru BITs) to five years (Colombia and South Korea BITs) from the moment the claimant became aware or ought to have become aware of the facts giving rise to the dispute.

No entity is specified in most BLEU BITs. The Colombia BIT specifies that a notice of dispute is to be addressed to:

Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Service of Economic Interests

15, Rue de Petits Carmes
B-1000 Brussels – Belgium.

Arbitral practice, however, has shown that one can serve the Ambassador of Belgium in the relevant country as well.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes

Direction des affaires européennes et des relations économiques internationales

9, rue du Palais de Justice
L-1841 Luxembourg
Luxembourg

It appears that investment treaty arbitrations on behalf of Belgium are managed by the Directorate-General of Legal Affairs, which falls under the purview of the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

To our knowledge, Luxembourg has never been a respondent to an investment treaty claim. Therefore, there is no relevant government practice. However, should this change, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is likely to be involved and coordinate with other concerned government departments.

In the two known claims, external counsel was used.

Luxembourg has never been a respondent to investment treaty claims. There is no specific formal public procurement process in place.

The Washington Convention entered into force in Belgium on 26 September 1970. Belgium ratified the Washington Convention through Loi du 17 juillet 1970 portant approbation de la Convention pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements entre Etats et ressortissants d’autres Etats, faite à Washington le 18 mars 1965 (Off. Gaz. 185, Sept. 24, 1970, p. 9548).

Luxembourg ratified the Washington Convention through the Law of 8 April 1970 approving the Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States signed in Washington on 18 March 1965. The Law entered into force on 13 May 1970.

Belgium ratified the New York Convention on 18 August 1975 (subject to the so-called reciprocity reservation) through the Law of 5 June 1975, published in the Moniteur/Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad on 15 November 1975.

Luxembourg ratified the New York Convention through the Law of 20 May 1983 approving the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Law entered into force on 25 June 1983.

The Belgian law on arbitration included as Title VI in the Belgian Judicial Code.

Articles 1224 to 1251 of the New Code of Civil Procedure are applicable.

A bill reforming Luxembourg arbitration law is currently before Parliament.¹³ The reform is inspired by French arbitration law as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law.

No publicly available awards have been rendered against Belgium as yet.

Not applicable as Luxembourg has never been a respondent in an investment treaty claim.

The Belgian federal government and the Luxembourg government generally have a favourable approach toward investment treaty arbitration. This is evidenced by the fact that they have entered into over 100 BITs and the ECT with other states, which typically offer investors an opportunity to enforce their treaty rights through investment treaty arbitration. That being said, the Belgian and Luxembourg governments (in alignment with the EU) are in favour of ISDS reform and the creation of a Multilateral Investment Court. This can be seen, for instance, in article 21 of the 2019 Model BIT.

Both Belgium and Luxembourg signed (but not ratified) the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention on Transparency), which is designed to make public information on investor-state arbitrations arising under investment treaties. The Convention entered into force on 18 October 2017.

To date, there has been only one instance where a Belgian court has set aside an investment treaty award. This was in Republic of Poland v. Manchester Securities Corp. In this decision, the Brussels Court of First Instance found that the arbitral tribunal had violated Belgium’s international public policy in finding that Poland had failed to guarantee a fair and equitable treatment (FET) to an investor because the Polish Supreme Court had denied justice through an arbitrary and discriminatory decision. The court reached this conclusion because the arbitral tribunal had, in its award, acted as an appeal court to the Polish Supreme Court. It appears that this decision has been appealed to the Belgian Court of Cassation. The proceedings are pending at the time of publication.

As for enforcement, Belgium is generally seen as an enforcement-friendly jurisdiction. There are limited instances where enforcement is refused. One such example is in the Republic of Kazakhstan v Stati & Ors. In this decision, the Court of Appeal in Brussels refused enforcement of an ECT award against Kazakhstan finding that the award had been obtained through fraud. In this regard, the court noted that it was not bound by a foreign decision rejecting the annulment of the same award. Instead, it retained the power to review whether the award and/or its enforcement was contrary to public policy, especially when they were new factual elements after the award that were unknown to the arbitrators at the relevant time.

To our knowledge, no investment treaty arbitration had its seat or place of arbitration in Luxembourg. Therefore, the attitude and supportive role of the local courts towards investment treaty arbitration is limited to the enforcement stage.

Given that Luxembourg is party to the ICSID Convention, the courts distinguish between ICSID and non-ICSID awards for the purposes of enforcement.

Generally, Luxembourg is seen as an enforcement-friendly jurisdiction subject to the following remarks regarding Luxembourg court practice.

In Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v Gold Reserve, the Luxembourg courts held that the existence of annulment proceedings before the courts of the seat are grounds to stay enforcement proceedings in Luxembourg.

Luxembourg being an EU member state, the courts are bound by EU law. In the most advanced intra-EU arbitration-related case (Romania v Micula), the Court of Cassation held that the enforcement of the award would be contrary to EU law and Romania’s immunity from jurisdiction. It therefore reversed the lower courts’ decision to enforce the award.

Finally, in Republic of Kazakhstan v Stati & Ors, the Luxembourg courts stayed enforcement proceedings as long as a local criminal investigation was pending, directly targeting fraud and corruption allegations linked to the arbitration proceeding itself.

Credendo 

Credendo is Belgium’s official export credit agency (https://credendo.com/en). It provides assistance to exporters and investors, principally in the form of insurance to Belgian exporters against non-payment by overseas buyers or political/commercial risk insurance to local investors investing abroad.

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

Since 18 September 1992, Belgium has been a member of the MIGA, one of the five institutions of the World Bank Group, and the only universal system of investment guarantees to cover nationals of a contracting state investing into a developing state, listed by the MIGA. To be eligible, the investment, besides being economically viable, must be made in a middle or long-term intent, should help develop the host country and comply with certain social, anticorruption, and environmental standards. The insurance policies tend to cover risks of the outward transfer of the benefits of the investment, the risks of expropriation and the risks of war or civil disturbance. Breach of contract is also covered, provided the investor has no access to any judicial remedy.

Luxembourg Export Credit Agency -‘Office du Ducroire Luxembourg’ (ODL) 

Created in 1961, the ODL is a public institution whose mission is to promote international economic and financial relations in the interest of Luxembourg, mainly through the acceptance of risks in the field of exports, imports and international investments. As such, the ODL offers foreign investment insurance guarantees to an exporting investor against events that may occur in the investment’s host country, such as expropriation, war, transfer restrictions, and certain breaches of contract. Among other things, insurance policies can cover equity creation and participation in a company, as well as investment loans with long-term repayment terms.

Furthermore, to qualify for compensation, the sustained loss must be final and irreversible.

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

Since 1991, Luxembourg has been a member of the MIGA, one of the five institutions of the World Bank Group, and the only universal system of investment guarantees to cover nationals of a contracting state investing into a developing state, listed by the MIGA. To be eligible, the investment, besides being economically viable, must be made in a middle or long-term intent, should help develop the host country and comply with certain social, anticorruption, and environmental standards. The insurance policies tend to cover risks of the outward transfer of the benefits of the investment, the risks of expropriation and the risks of war or civil disturbance. Breach of contract is also covered, provided the investor has no access to any judicial remedy. 

Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004

Cascade Investments NV v Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/18/4)

Kimberly-Clark Dutch Holdings, BV, Kimberly-Clark SLU, and Kimberly-Clark BVBA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/18/3)

(DS)2, SA, Peter de Sutter and Kristof De Sutter v Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/18)

Tariq Bashir and SA Interpétrol Burundi v Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/31)

Zelena NV and Energo-Zelena doo Inđija v Republic of Serbia (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/27)

Blusun SA, Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v Italian Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/14/3)

Lieven J van Riet, Chantal C van Riet and Christopher van Riet v Republic of Croatia (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/12)

Joseph Houben v Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/7) (BLEU-Burundi BIT)

Baggerwerken Decloedt En Zoon NV v Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/27)

Electrabel SA v Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19)

Jan de Nul NV and Dredging International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13)

Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No ARB/01/2)

Philippe Gruslin v Malaysia (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3)

Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No ARB/95/3)

Philippe Gruslin v Malaysia (ICSID Case No. ARB/94/1)

Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Limited v Kingdom of Belgium (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29)

SREW NV v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/52)

Sapec SA v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/23)

LSF-KEB Holdings SCA and others v Republic of Korea (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/37)

DP World Limited v Kingdom of Belgium (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/21)

Kristof de Sutter, Peter de Sutter and (DS)2, SA v Republic of Madagascar (II)

(ICSID Case No. ARB/17/18)

Sun Reserve Luxco Holdings SRL v Italian Republic (SCC Case No. 132/2016)

9REN Holding Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15)

Belenergia SA v Italian Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40)

Capital Financial Holdings Luxembourg SA v Republic of Cameroon (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/18)

Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20)

Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 Sàrl, Foresight Luxembourg Solar 2 Sàrl, Greentech Energy System A/S, GWM Renewable Energy I SPA and GWM Renewable Energy II SPA v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2015/150)

Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment (SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II Italian Portfolio SA v Italian Republic (SCC Case No. 2015/095)

Hydro Energy 1 Sàrl. and Hydroxana Sweden AB v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/42)

Novenergia II - Energy & Environment (SCA), SICAR v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 063/2015)

Watkins Holdings Sàrl. and others v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/44)

GPF GP Sàrl v Poland (SCC Case No. 2014/168)

PL Holdings Sar. v Poland (SCC Case No. 2014/163)

Kristof De Sutter, Peter De Sutter, DS 2 SA and Polo Garments Majunga Sàrl v Republic of Madagascar (I)

Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No ARB/13/36)

Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl and Energia Termosolar BV (formerly Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl and Antin Energia Termosolar BV) v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31)

RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30)

Charanne BV and Construction Investments Sarl v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 062/2012)

Orascom TMT Investments Sàrl v People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/35)

Tenaris SA and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (II) (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/23)

Tenaris SA and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (I) (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/26)

The PV Investors v Kingdom of Spain (PCA Case No. 2012-14)

European Media Ventures SA v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL

BRIF TRES doo Beograd and BRIF-TC doo Beograd v Republic of Serbia (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/12)

FinDoc Srl, Domenica Gazineo, EnDoc Srl and others v Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/35)

Odebrecht Latinvest Sàrl v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/4)

Canepa Green Energy Opportunities I, Sàrl and Canepa Green Energy Opportunities II, Sárl v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/4)

Puma Energy Holdings SARL v the Republic of Benin

Triodos SICAV II v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 2017-194)

CIC Renewable Energies Italy GmbH, Enernovum Asset 1 GmbH & Co KG, Enernovum GmbH & Co KG and others v Italian Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/39)

Infracapital F1 Sàrl and Infracapital Solar BV v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/18)

Theodoros Adamakopoulos, Ilektra Adamantidou, Vasileios Adamopoulos and others v Republic of Cyprus (ICSID Case No. ARB/15/49)

RENERGY Sàrl v Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/18)

CSP Equity Investment Sarl v Kingdom of Spain (SCC Case No. 094/2013)

GIHG Limited, Natland Group Limited, Natland Investment Group NV, and Radiance Energy Holding Sàrl v The Czech Republic (PCA Case No. 2013-35)

Yukos Capital Sàrl v The Russian Federation (PCA Case No. 2013-31)

LSF-KEB Holdings SCA and others v Republic of Korea (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/37)

Willem Van de Voorde, ‘Belgian Bilateral Investment Treaties as a Means for Promoting And Protecting Foreign Investment’ (1991) 44(1) Studia Diplomatica 87-112

Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Lise Johnson, ‘Belgium’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A review’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, March 2010

Guillaume Croisant and Xavier Taton, ‘At a glance: investment treaty practice in Belgium’, Lexology, 29 October 2021, www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=14c3b86b-af1e-4001-bd62-488e2c768668 (accessed on 6 July 2022)

Niuscha Bassiri and Maarten Draye, Arbitration in Belgium: A Practitioner’s Guide (Wolters Kluwer, 31 March 2016).

Pascal Hollander and Maarten Draye, ‘Belgium’ in IBA Arbitration Committee 2012 Arbitration Guide (Updated February 2018), https://www.ibanet.org/MediaHandler?id=E41B7EF2-24A3-4456-B311-8B51DDE1AAB4