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The European, Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2016

France

Four topics will be discussed in this update on arbitration law in France arising from recent French court decisions on the application and interpretation of the new French law on International Arbitration (2011 Decree). First will be presented the latest clarifications provided on arbitrators’ duties of independence and impartiality, along with their related obligation to disclose and ongoing duty to inform. Second, since last year’s article, the Reims Court of Appeal’s decision in the Tecnimont case has been overturned by the French Civil Supreme Court. Although the grounds of this decision are unexpected, it reinforces the contractual value of institutional rules and the parties’ obligation to bring their challenges against arbitrators in due time. Third, the much awaited annulment decision of the award rendered in the Tapie case was handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal bringing confusion to the previously clear distinction between international and domestic arbitration under French law. Lastly, article 1526 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, until now clear in its drafting but less so in terms of its application, has been sufficiently applied by the courts so as to identify a common interpretative approach to the terms of the article.

Arbitrators’ independence, impartiality, obligation to disclose and duty to inform

Three major decisions were rendered in the past two years on arbitrators’ obligations of independence and impartiality.

The first case relates to annulment proceedings initiated by the Antoine Tabet Group (GAT) regarding an award rendered in favor of the Republic of Congo. The GAT alleged that, in his declaration of independence and impartiality, one of the arbitrators had failed to disclose his personal ties with a company affiliated to one of the Republic of Congo’s counterparties. The French Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that such an omission did not constitute sufficient grounds for annulment as long as it had no impact on the outcome of the case.1 This decision is consistent with the previously commented Tesco decision.2

By way of contrast, the previous edition of this article3 had discussed a decision handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal, which had annulled a domestic arbitral award on the ground that one of the arbitrators had submitted a ‘deliberately truncated’ declaration of independence and impartiality: while having disclosed that he attended a conference where the claimant’s opposing party’s counsel was a speaker, the arbitrator omitted to disclose both having sat with said counsel on an organisation’s board of directors and having presided over another association which had a partnership with the counsel’s law firm. This decision has since been confirmed by the French Civil Supreme Court.4 This raises questions as to how strict a standard the French Supreme Court might apply in matters relating to an arbitrator’s obligation to disclose.5

In the third case, the claimant alleged that the sole arbitrator, who worked as a lawyer in a major international law firm, had failed to disclose that attorneys at his firm were assisting the opposing party’s mother company in a major acquisition. Contrary to the approach adopted in the GAT case, the Paris Court of Appeal annulled the decision that had previously granted exequatur to the award, despite any evidence of the arbitral award having been tainted by this undisclosed connection.6 This decision, based on the arbitrator’s failure to disclose an element that may have been of interest to the parties, has been qualified as ‘severe’ by some authors. Notably, this decision of the Paris Court of Appeal establishes a criterion different from the one previously set forth by the French Civil Supreme Court (who seeks to identify a significant flow of business between one party and the challenged arbitrator). Instead, the Court in this instance relied on other criteria and held that the ambit of the transaction itself, the number of attorneys working on the case, and the recognition earned by the law firm from the transaction were sufficient elements to question the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality, simultaneously disregarding the very low price charged by the law firm for this transaction.7

Two additional issues were also raised in this case. First, the Paris Court of Appeal held that the fact claimants had suggested the arbitrator’s name was irrelevant to assessing the validity of their challenge for lack of independence and impartiality. Second, the arbitrator’s duty to disclose must be counterbalanced with the notoriety of the undisclosed fact and the party’s obligation of due diligence when naming or suggesting an arbitrator. Consistent with its prior stance,8 the Court underlined that the obligation to disclose is still incumbent upon the arbitrator. In a decision rendered shortly thereafter, the French Civil Supreme Court further confirmed that parties are not expected to undergo a systematic review of all references to an arbitrator’s name, nor are they expected to pursue their investigation after the beginning of the arbitration proceedings.9 Parties are nonetheless presumed to have researched notorious facts regarding the arbitrator so that an arbitrator may not be sanctioned and his award may not be annulled if the information was publicly available.10

These decisions have triggered a large amount of contradicting commentaries by scholars on the obligations to disclose and to inform, and the notions of independence and impartiality as understood by the French courts.11 Indeed, an ambiguity exists on the scope of the obligation to disclose, and to what extent it includes or is simply a part of the obligations of independence and impartiality. One author draws a line between the obligation to disclose and the obligation to inform. The court will find a breach of the obligation to disclose if, on the basis of the facts that the arbitrator failed to communicate, serious doubts may be raised as to whether he or she in fact acted independently and impartially when taking his or her decision. Conversely, a duty to inform refers to the obligation to share any information that may alter the parties’ trust in the members of the arbitral tribunal, without going so far as to constitute a basis for questioning the arbitrators’ independence and impartiality. The only consequence of a breach of the obligation to inform could be that parties may not nominate the arbitrators in question in the future, whereas a breach of the obligation to disclose may lead to a finding of the arbitrator’s lack of independence and impartiality and thus to the annulment of the award.12

Finally, the Paris Court of Appeal recently confirmed that an arbitrator’s participation in the tribunal of an analogous case is not, in and of itself, a sufficient motive to question his or her independence and impartiality.13 All of these decisions are of particular interest in light of the International Bar Association’s recent publication of a revised version of the Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.14

Tecnimont has been overturned, but on unexpected grounds: the binding effect of institutional rules is confirmed

Prior decisions relating to the Tecnimont case gave rise to issues relating to the arbitrators’ obligation of independence and impartiality, as commented upon in previous versions of this article. In a nutshell, an arbitral award was rendered in 2007 under the aegis of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). One of the parties discovered facts that raised serious doubts over one of the arbitrators’ independence and impartiality but failed to challenge the arbitrator within the time limit provided by the ICC Arbitration Rules. As discussed in the two previous editions of this article,15 in its decision of 2 November 2009, the Reims Court of Appeal found that the arbitrator in question had breached his duty of independence and impartiality given that his disclosure was incomplete and did not mention his links with counsel, later discovered by one of the opposing parties.16

In the subsequent challenge, the French Civil Supreme Court was expected to render a much awaited decision on arbitrators’ obligations of independence and impartiality and related obligation to disclose. Instead, the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the basis of the interaction between institutional rules and French international arbitration law.17

The French Civil Supreme Court acknowledged the superiority of the contractual value of the institutional rules agreed by the parties. In this case, the Reims Court of Appeal had failed to reach the right conclusion since the arbitrator had been challenged by one of the parties after the expiration of the time limit set out in the institutional rules.

In many other cases, institutional rules have been put aside by French courts, giving priority to other standards. For example, in the previously commented decision of Pirelli,18 the French Civil Supreme Court annulled an award where Pirelli’s counterclaims had been considered withdrawn by the ICC due to the parties’ failure to pay their share of the advance on costs, as provided for by the institutional rules. This was held to amount to a violation of the French international public order and the right to a fair trial. Likewise, in SNF v ICC,19 a limited liability clause arising out of the institution’s arbitration rules was considered null and void for breaching the French international public order. In both cases, the French court gave primacy to the French international public order rather than to the institutional rules.20

In this case, however, according to the applicable institutional rules, the parties had 30 days to challenge the arbitrator. This time limit was found to be sufficient, considering that many other arbitration rules provide for a shorter amount of time to challenge an arbitrator, and especially that, in French international arbitration law, the time limit to challenge an arbitrator is also thirty days after the parties discover evidence of a lack of impartiality and independence (article 1456 paragraph 3 of the French Code of Civil Procedure). Therefore, in the absence of any violation of the French international public order, the institutional rule takes priority: when the time limit provided for challenging an arbitrator has expired, the parties are considered to have waived their right to bring a challenge. The Court of Appeal decision was thus set aside and it has now been sent back to the Paris Court of Appeal for reconsideration. Depending on what this court will decide, there may still be further petitions and decisions in the Tecnimont case.

For now, the decision of the French Civil Supreme Court reinforces the contractual value of institutional rules and the parties’ obligation to react and bring their challenges against arbitrators in due time, thus preventing dilatory tactics.21

The Tapie case: domestic and international arbitrations (re)defined

On 17 February 2015, the Paris Court of Appeal rendered a much awaited decision in the Tapie case, where it was mainly required to determine whether the arbitration was of a domestic or an international nature.22

The Tapie case, in its multiple facets, has kept lawyers, judges, journalists and arbitration-specialists on edge since 2008. The initial facts are the following: Bernard Tapie and his wife (the Tapies) were the founders of multiple companies incorporated under French and German law (the Tapie Companies), through which they acquired the German company Adidas AG in 1991. This acquisition was financed by way of loan from SdBO, a subsidiary of Crédit Lyonnais. At the time, the French state was the main shareholder of Crédit Lyonnais. In 1992, Bernard Tapie embarked upon a political career and mandated SdBO for the sale of Adidas. SdBO sold Adidas AG at the agreed minimum price of 2.1 billion francs to a consortium of eight acquirers. Bernard Tapie was not aware at the time that Crédit Lyonnais had also acted on behalf of the acquirers and had long anticipated both this sale and the two thirds of the capital gain that it would keep.

The Tapie Companies involved in the acquisition of Adidas subsequently went bankrupt and its administration was put in the hands of liquidators. The latter initiated legal proceedings against SdBO and Crédit Lyonnais. In 2007, the Tapies and the liquidators on one hand and the CDR (a consortium that was set up to administer Credit Lyonnais’ assets in light of its quasi-bankruptcy) on the other signed an agreement to settle their dispute by way of arbitration, with a three-member arbitral tribunal. In 2008, the arbitral tribunal rendered its award in favour of the Tapies and the liquidators. Ultimately, the CDR applied for the annulment of the award.

A criminal investigation was later initiated against the arbitrators, which brought to light significant evidence of the existence of an undisclosed relationship between Bernard Tapie and the co-arbitrator named by the liquidators and the Tapies. This relationship had presumably interfered with the arbitration: the arbitrator with the undisclosed relationship had weighed in favour of the defendant, whilst the two other arbitrators had remained passive. The CDR thus applied for a re-examination of the arbitral award, which is a specific type of procedure that allows state judges to review domestic awards in cases of fraud. The liquidators and the Tapies argued that the arbitration was in fact international in nature and that it could therefore not be re-examined by a state court pursuant to the French law on international arbitration; it would follow that the allegations of fraud could only have been brought before the arbitral tribunal itself.23

After heated debates between the parties, both in court and in the media, the Paris Court of Appeal held that the arbitration was of a domestic nature, and thus found grounds for its re-­examination. This decision was welcomed by those who believed that, in this case, international arbitration had been instrumentalised to cover up the defendants and the co-arbitrator’s substantial fraud.24

Under French law on international arbitration, parties may not decide whether the arbitration proceedings and the final award should be treated as domestic or international: this question is settled by the judge.25 Further, the international nature of arbitration proceedings is defined on the basis of an economic criterion:26 to qualify as being international in nature, arbitration proceedings must raise issues relating to international trade. Indeed, article 1504 of the French Code of Civil Procedure holds that: ‘An arbitration is international when international trade interests are at stake.’

In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal considered that the arbitration and the dispositive article of the award – by which it perhaps intended to refer to the execution of the award, although this may be doubted27 – did not lead to a ‘transnational economic transfer’. Indeed, in the present case, the arbitration was based on an arbitration agreement directly aimed at resolving three disputes arising under French law, where the decisions would not require or lead to any transnational economic transfer.

The criterion used here by the Paris Court of Appeal is not the one usually relied upon by French courts to define the international nature of arbitration proceedings and of awards. Indeed, French courts have generally analysed ‘the economic interests at the origin of the dispute’ to characterise the international nature of an arbitration.28 This was the basis of the defendant’s position, which argued that the arbitration was international because the main issue in dispute related to the sale of Adidas, which comprised a sale mandate and a disposal both governed by German law, and assets of a German company.29 The Paris Court of Appeal held, on the contrary, that the dispute did not directly concern the Adidas sale but rather the mandate contract, involving a French client and a French bank, and that the money transfers and the remuneration of the relevant agents all took place in France. Nonetheless, even in similar contexts, the Paris Court of Appeal has previously qualified other arbitrations as being international in nature.30

One author considers that this decision may nonetheless be justified: in a case where all of the parties are French and there were no circumstances in which the case could have been brought to another country’s courts, nothing would justify the applicability of rules of international arbitration rather than domestic arbitration.31 In reality, the Paris Court of Appeal having not provided its detailed reasoning on this question, any analysis thereof is limited to the formulation of hypothesis.

Finally, it may be queried whether the decision undermines the formerly clear distinction between domestic and international arbitration based on the international character of the origin of the dispute – the Paris Court of Appeal may be aiming to adopt a more restrictive definition of international arbitration – or whether this decision was opportunistic, simply motivated by the peculiar (political) circumstances of the case, or the (schizophrenic)32 state’s interests at stake.33

Recent applications of article 1526 of the French Code of Civil Procedure shed light on new tools arising out of the 2011 Decree

The 2011 Decree modified the previous rules applicable to international arbitration in France and introduced a new provision barring the suspension of an award’s enforcement even in case of annulment proceedings.

This provision contrasts with the position in French domestic arbitration, where an annulment action will lead to the suspension of the enforcement of the award. This evolution in the French law on international arbitration was aimed at avoiding dilatory tactics by parties challenging adverse awards with the sole purpose of creating obstacles to their enforcement.34

The counter-effect, however, of this immediate efficiency of international arbitral awards is that, if the award was in fact rendered in violation of due process or of the international public order, it will nonetheless trigger immediate consequences. To diminish this adverse counter-effect, in the 2011 Decree, the legislator included a ‘protective’ provision codified at article 1526, giving the judge the possibility to suspend or set conditions for the enforcement of an award (paragraph 2 of article 1526 of the French Code on Civil Procedure). This power is in the hands either of the first president ruling in expedited proceedings or of the judge assigned to the matter.

Article 1526 of the current French Code of Civil Procedure thus provides that:

Neither an action to set aside an award nor an appeal against an enforcement order shall suspend the enforcement of an award.

     However, the first president ruling in expedited proceedings (référé) or, once the matter is referred to him or her, the judge assigned to the matter (conseiller de la mise en état), may stay or set conditions for enforcement of an award where enforcement could severely prejudice the rights of one of the parties.

This power conferred by article 1526 of the French Code of Civil Procedure will only be brought to bear if the award might ‘severely prejudice the rights of one of the parties’. This ambiguous criterion had not given rise to much interpretation until 2014, especially as it is only applicable to awards rendered after the entry into force of the 2011 Decree (1 May 2011). It was only one year after the decree’s entry into force that the first decisions were rendered on the basis of this article that granted either the suspension or other arrangements by the judge of the enforcement proceedings.35 In the past year, four decisions have been handed down on this issue,36 thus giving some illustrations of the interpretation to be given to article 1526. This interpretation shows that French courts are so far taking a case-by-case approach.37 Two main observations may be made on the applicability of article 1526.

The first observation is that the judge will either grant or not the suspension of enforcement proceedings independently of the merits of the arguments made in support of the annulment proceedings.38 The purpose of article 1526 is not only to avoid dilatory tactics, but also and mainly to safeguard the parties’ rights that could be affected by the award’s immediate enforcement. Linking the merits of the arguments on annulment to the judge’s decision on suspension of the enforcement proceedings would be simplistic, and could result in pre-judging the merits of the annulment proceeding.

The second observation is that the courts will grant the suspension of the enforcement proceedings if the immediate execution of the award would lead to disproportionate consequences for one of the parties (ie, before the judge in the annulment proceedings has had a chance to render his decision).39 It therefore seems that paragraph 2 of article 1526 of the French Code of Civil Procedure requires the judge to make a concrete analysis of the repercussions of the enforcement of the award: for instance, the enforcement of the award will likely be suspended if it would lead to the debtor’s bankruptcy or if the award debtor would incur disproportionate difficulties in getting its payment back, were the award annulled.40 One decision also held that, since a large amount of the quantum was made up of an immaterial or moral compensation, it was safer to suspend the enforcement of the award, recalling standards of due process.41 Nevertheless, another decision emphasised that the high amount of damages awarded did not, in and of itself, justify the suspension of the award’s enforcement.42

Notes

  1. Groupe Antoine Tabet v Congo Republic, French Civil Supreme Court, 25 June 2014, No. 11-16444, S Bollée, Note, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2015, No. 1, pp. 75-84.
  2. French Civil Supreme Court, 10 October 2012, No. 11-20.299.
  3. X Nyssen, P Dunham, The European, Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2015, ‘France’, Global Arbitration Review.
  4. French Civil Supreme Court, 18 December 2014, No. 14-11085; confirming Paris Court of Appeal, 29 October 2013, No. 12-117423.
  5. M Danis, Obligation de révélation et conséquence du défaut de sincérité de la déclaration d’indépendance, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 January 2015, No. 1, p. 95.
  6. SA Auto Guadeloupe Investissements v Columbus Acquisitions Inc et al, Paris Court of Appeal, 14 October 2014, No. 13/13459.
  7. D Cohen, Encore l’indépendance de l’arbitre et sort de l’exequatur de la sentence, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 December 2014, No. 4, p. 795.
  8. See also, Cogelec v Siemens, Paris Court of Appeal, 14 January 2014, No. 12-15140.
  9. French Civil Supreme Court, 18 December 2014, No. 14-11085.
  10. Paris Court of Appeal, 1 April 2014, No. 12-15479.
  11. Obligation de révélation et conséquence du défaut de sincérité de la déclaration d’indépendance, M Danis, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 January 2015, No. 1, p. 95 ; Encore l’indépendance de l’arbitre et sort de l’exequatur de la sentence, D Cohen, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 December 2014, No. 4, p. 795.
  12. SA Auto Guadeloupe Investissements v Columbus Acquisitions Inc et al, Paris Court of Appeal, 14 October 2014, No. 13/13459, M Henry, Note, Rev Arb, 2015, No. 1, pp. 151-182.
  13. Monsieur Faisal Bin Fayyadh Al Gobain v SA Crédit Foncier de France, Paris Court of Appeal, 9 September 2014, No. 13/01333; A Pinna, L’indépendance et l’impartialité de l’arbitre désigné dans deux procédures connexes, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 December 2014, No. 4, p. 805.
  14. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, adopted by resolution of the IBA Council on 23 October 2013; G Bertrou, Q de Margerie, Obligation de révélation de l’arbitre: tentative de synthèse après la publication des nouvelles règles de l’IBA, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 January 2015, No. 1, p. 29.
  15. X Nyssen, P Dunham, The European, Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2015, ‘France’, Global Arbitration Review; T Portwood, The European, Middle Eastern and African Arbitration Review 2013, ‘France’, Global Arbitration Review.
  16. Reims Court of Appeal, 2 November 2011, No. 10/02888; L Kante, ‘Lorsque l’obligation de révélation se transforme en obligation d’investigation’ in ‘Chronique de droit de l’arbitrage no. 9 (Suite et fin)’, Petites affiches, 17 July 2012, No. 142, p3 ; M Henry, ‘Note – 2 novembre 2011, Cour d’appel de Reims’, Rev Arb 2012, p120, Article 4, 5; T Clay, ‘Arbitrage et modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges’, D 2012, p2991.
  17. French Civil Supreme Court, 25 June 2014, No. 11-26.529; J Arnaldez, A Mezghani, Note, Rev Arb 2015, No. 1, pp. 85-96.
  18. French Court of Cassation, 28 March 2013, No. 11-27770; Paris Court of Appeal, 17 November 2011, No. 09/24158; F-X Train, ‘Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 27 novembre 2011 dans l’affaire LP c/ Pirelli)’, Rev arb 2012, p267 ; P Chevalier, ‘L’affaire Pirelli resituée dans son contexte’, Cahiers de l’arbitrage 2013, No. 3, p. 585; L Weiller, ‘Retour sur l’effectivité du droit au juge arbitral’, Procédures 2013, No. 6, comm 189.
  19. SNF SAS v International Chamber of Commerce, Paris Court of Appeal, 22 January 2009, No. 07/19492.
  20. T Clay, Tecnimont, saison 4: entre révélation et réaction, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 October 2014, No. 3, p. 547 ; see also, SNF SAS v International Chamber of Commerce, Paris Court of Appeal, 22 January 2009, No. 07/19492.
  21. French Civil Supreme Court, 25 March 1999, No. 94-18.976 ; P Chevalier, Impartialité de l’arbitre, étendue de son obligation de révélation et promptitude à agir des parties, Recueil Dalloz 2014, 1981.
  22. Paris Court of Appeal, 17 February 2015, No. 13/132778 ; Admission du recours en révision contre la sentence Tapie c. Crédit Lyonnais, Dalloz actualité, 20 February 2015.
  23. Fougerolles, French Supreme Court, 25 May 1992, No. 90-18.210.
  24. T Clay, Au tapis !, Recueil Dalloz, 2015, p. 425 ; La volonté des parties et la nature interne ou international d’un arbitrage, Gazette du Palais, 4 April 2015, No. 94, p. 17.
  25. Paris Court of Appeal, 24 April 1992 ; French Civil Supreme Court, 6 April 1994 ; Paris Court of Appeal, 29 March 2001 ; La volonté des parties et la nature interne ou international d’un arbitrage, Gazette du Palais, No. 94, p. 17, 4 April 2015 ; D Bureau, L’office du juge et la qualification interne ou international de l’arbitrage, Rev. Arb. 2014, pp. 384-388.
  26. D Mouralis, Affaire Tapie-Adidas: les sentences arbitrales sont rétractées, Recueil Dalloz, 2015, p. 1253.
  27. S Bollée, L’accueil du recours en révision formé contre la sentence Tapie, JCP G, No. 10-11, 9 March 2015, 289.
  28. French Civil Supreme Court, 20 November 2013, No. 12-25266
  29. M Nioche, Chronique de jurisprudence de procédure civile (chronique), Gazette du Palais, 16 June 2015, No. 167, p. 22.
  30. Courrèges Designe v Sté André Courrèges, Paris Court of Appeal, 5 April 1990; Sté Chambon v Sté Thomson CSF, Paris Court of Appeal, 10 September 1997; French Civil Supreme Court, 8 March 1988, No. 86-12015.
  31. S Bollée, L’accueil du recours en révision formé contre la sentence Tapie, JCP G, No. 10-11, 9 March 2015, 289.
  32. A de Fontmichel, Rétractation d’une sentence arbitrale surprise par la fraude d’un arbitre, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 July 2015, No. 2, p. 281.
  33. D Mouralis, Affaire Tapie-Adidas: les sentences arbitrales sont rétractées, Recueil Dalloz, 2015, p. 1253.
  34. J Pellerin, La suppression de l’effet suspensif des recours contre les sentences internationales et étrangères en droit français, in Nassib G. Ziadé, Festschrift Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri, 2015, pp. 143-154.
  35. I Léger, L’arrêt de l’exécution provisoire des sentences arbitrales internationales par le juge, Petites Affiches, 28 October 2014, No. 215.
  36. Fairtrade, Ord. CME, Paris, P. 1, ch. 1, 27 March 2014, No. 13/24165, Farmex, 3 April 2014, No. 13/22288; Note, Philippe Leboulanger, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2015, No. 1, pp. 111-117; Pilliot, 4 July 2014, No. 14/12102; Cnan, Paris Court of Appeal, p. 1, chapter 5, 11 July 2014, No. 14/08157.
  37. C Jarrosson, J Pellerin, La notification et l’exécution de la sentence (article 1519 et 1526 CPC) : Droit transitoire et conditios d‘application, note sous Paris, Pôle 1 – Ch. 5 (Ord. Prem. Prés.), 18 October 2011, Paris, Pôle 1 – Ch. 1 (Ord. Cons. Mise en état), 8 March 2012 et Paris, Pôle 1 Cha. 1 (Ord. Cons. Mise en état, 3 May 2012, Rev arb, 2012, No. 2, pp. 403-408 ; L De Maria, Le sursis à exécution de la sentence internationale ou étrangère en cas de recours (article 1526, al. 2), Jacques Pellerin, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 1 December 2014, No. 4, p. 783.
  38. Fairtrade, Ord. CME, Paris, P. 1, ch. 1, 27 March 2014 No. 13/24165.
  39. Pilliot, Ord. CME, 4 July 2014, No. 14/12102.
  40. SASU Spie Batingnolles Nord v Chemoprojekt, Paris Court of Appeal, 23 April 2013, No. 13/02612.
  41. Pilliot, Ord. CME, 4 July 2014. No. 14/12102.
  42. Organisme République Boldivarienne du Venezuela v Société Gold Reserve INC, Paris Court of Appeal, Ord, Pole 1, 1st Chamber, 29 January 2015, (14/21103), where the US$713 million award was not suspended, the court taking under consideration the fact that this award was rendered against a state, so that the quantum had reasons to be of a high amount.